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ABSTRACT 
China has incentives to exploit the North Korean nuclear crisis to exact 
diplomatic, economic and security advantages.  The inherent dangers involved in 
the crisis (that it sparks a nuclear cascade or regional proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, that Japan will build a more offensive military as a deterrent, that North 
Korea could explosively collapse, or that the United States will preemptively 
strike Pyongyang and start a regional conflict) do not completely constrain 
China’s foreign policy decisions.  Furthermore, Beijing enjoys a certain coercive 
influence over Pyongyang as the old “lips and teeth” relationship eroded to one of 
mild indifference or embarrassment allowing China to exploit its little brother.  To 
this end, the crisis offers Beijing opportunities at gaining regional leadership, 
greater economic development, and affords certain positive consequences for 
the Taiwan issue.   
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In one-millionth of a second, a hot gas bubble formed underground, the 
temperature rose to one million degrees, and a sonic shockwave broke and 
melted the rocks in every direction, continuously expanding until finally collapsing 
in on itself.1  In Seoul, the Richter scale read a 3.582 earthquake originating in 
North Korea’s North Hamgyeong Province, a sign that Pyongyang detonated a 
large underground explosion.3  Days later, radiological material leaked into the 
atmosphere confirmed the report that North Korea indeed detonated a plutonium-
based device.4  North Korea hinted at nuclear weapons, declared its possession 
of said weapons, and ultimately detonated one over a span of 16 years under the 
weary and watchful eye of the international community.   
Only Pyongyang reacted positively to the October 9, 2006, test.  The 
United States and Japan adamantly called for sanctions and a strongly worded 
condemnation from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).  South Korea, 
China and Russia, while disappointed in Kim Jong-Il’s actions, demanded a 
softer tone.  In the end, Resolution 1718 fell shy of full sanctions and was 
considerably less threatening than Tokyo desired.  Beijing’s role in calming the 
region during the second nuclear crisis, beginning in 2002 and immediately after 
the test, is commendable.  The consistent statement from Beijing’s foreign 
ministry requests that all parties “keep calm and show restraint” and that regional 
neighbors should “Adopt a responsible attitude to safeguard regional peace and 
                                            
1 Based on the description of an underground nuclear test found in: Samuel Glasstone and 
Phillip J. Dolan, “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” United States Department of Defense and the 
Energy Research and Development Administration,  1977, 61,  
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/effects/effects2.pdf (accessed February 2007). 
2 The U.S. Geological Survey Richter scale readings read 4.2.   
3 “Nuclear Weapons Testing,” Weapons of Mass Destruction, Global Security.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-test.htm (accessed February 2007). 
4 Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, “North Korean Fuel Identified as Plutonium,” The New 
York Times, October 17, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/world/asia/17diplo.html?ex=1172811600&en=9a08eac03f72
5c73&ei=5070, (accessed February 2007). 
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stability.”5  The United States and Japan may not agree with the direction Beijing 
takes in the crisis and, while both states can appreciate the effort, questions 
remain. 
Is China fully committed to the denuclearization and peaceful end to the 
North Korean nuclear crisis?  What are Beijing’s most prevalent concerns 
regarding the peninsula and do those concerns limit its actions?  Is China in a 
position to influence North Korea and is it willing to do so?  How does the 
continued crisis benefit Beijing?  This thesis shows that Beijing is not fearful of a 
nuclear North Korea and that its coercive influence over Pyongyang helps exploit 
the situation for diplomatic, economic and security advantages.  
Several schools of thought assess the depth of China’s commitment to 
North Korea’s denuclearization and its ability for influencing North Korea 
diplomatically.  The six arguments below differ in estimating Beijing’s influence 
over North Korea during the crisis and the degree to which it uses or does not 
use that influence.  The first argument suggests that Beijing has very little to no 
influence over Pyongyang and will not take any steps to exert pressure during 
the crisis.  While Beijing once enjoyed a “lips and teeth” relationship with 
Pyongyang, today’s relationship lacks any semblance of warmth.6   Andrew 
Scobell cites one example of when a Chinese visitor to the DPRK museum in 
Panmunjom reflected his disappointment that there were no references to 
China’s immense role in the Korean War.  “It is no exaggeration to say that many 
Chinese view the North Koreans as ingrates.”7 As the past few years have 
exposed this weakening relationship, Beijing has struggled to remain a viable 
member of the multi-lateral talks.  As Bruce Klingner points out: 
Beijing was unable to compel North Korea to give up either of its 
nuclear weapons programs, despite having identified it as a core 
                                            
5 Sun Shangwu.  “Restraint is ‘Best Way to Ease Tension.’” China Daily Website, October 13, 
2006.  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-10/13/content_707322.htm.  
6 Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: From Comrades-In-Arms to Allies at Arm’s 
Length,” Strategic Studies Institute (March 2004): 19, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi. 
7 Scobell 2004, 19. 
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strategic national interest of China…North Korea’s missile launch 
[on July 4, 2006], despite the unusual public warning by Chinese 
President Hu Jintao, was seen as a significant loss of face for 
Beijing.8 
As Klingner points out, not only is Beijing unable to protect its own national 
interests, but even during intense consultation with Pyongyang over the missile 
launches, it was incapable of affecting North Korea’s actions.  This argument 
also asserts that China is unwilling to influence North Korea despite, or perhaps 
because of, international pressure.  This school of thought is the least prevalent 
among the six perspectives presented here.   
The second and most popular assessment surmises that Beijing retains 
limited influence that has been overshadowed by fear of the consequences of 
action.  Essentially, Beijing is crippled by the fear of collapsing the North Korean 
regime or losing face in the process of exerting influence.  This argument points 
out that Beijing has the capability to stop oil and food flowing to North Korea, but 
it is more concerned with a regime collapse or with maintaining the semblance of 
stability than a nuclear weapon in the hands of Kim Jong Il.9  One contention is 
that refugees threaten to drown an already sinking economy in China’s “rust belt” 
along the North Korean border.10  One of China’s specific fears is the reaction of 
the ethnic Koreans in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture if China took 
violent action against fleeing North Koreans during a mass exodus.11  The local 
economy, already suffering from severe unemployment, could not accept the 
increase of hundreds of thousands of dispossessed North Koreans.  The second 
                                            
8 Bruce Klingner, “The Regional Security Implications of North Korea’s Missile Launch,”  
Korea and World Affairs 30, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 344-360. 
9 Doug Bandow, “Enlisting China to Stop a Nuclear North Korea,” The Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis 18, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 73-93; Denny Roy, “Going Straight, but Somewhat 
Late: China and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (February 
2006), http://www.apcss.com; Scobell 2004. 
10 Bandow 2006; Scobell 2004. 
11 Howard M. Krawitz, “Resolving Korea’s Nuclear Crisis: Tough Choices for China,” 
Strategic Forum 201 (August 2003), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html, (accessed 
January 2007). 
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contention in this camp is that “Beijing’s top priority is to preserve North Korea as 
a buffer state.”12  In this argument, action by Beijing could fold North Korea in 
with South Korea, which places United States forces, or U.S. allies, on China’s 
border.  For Beijing, this is a fear worse than nuclear proliferation on the 
peninsula and severely hinders its actions.  As one author points out, Beijing can 
live with a nuclear North Korea, but it cannot live without North Korea itself.13 
The third argument contends that Beijing has limited influence in the crisis 
but does not have the political will to use that influence.  One author even 
reports, “Beijing does not believe North Korea threatens Chinese interests or 
Chinese national security, nor does China necessarily see North Korea as a 
destabilizing element in East Asia.”14  Under those conditions, Beijing is unwilling 
to exert undue pressure on North Korea because there is no shared threat from 
the United States.  Most authors agree that China provides a majority of North 
Korea’s basic needs and this argument references that economic fact as the 
main leverage Beijing has with its neighbor.  After detailing the support China 
provides for North Korea, Victor Cha and David Kang, two well-respected 
scholars in the field, conclude that the amount of aid is a “testament to the 
capabilities Beijing can bring to bear on the North if the political will is there.”15  In 
essence, Beijing has coercive, threatening influence over Pyongyang.  The logic 
then follows that if China has not yet introduced the severe sanctions to limit 
these supplies, the PRC must lack the political will.   
The fourth argument asserts that Beijing has some influence on North 
Korea and is working the issue via its own method.  In other words, Beijing is not 
using coercion as pressed by the United States, but rather an incentive-driven 
                                            
12 Ted Galen Carpenter, “Great Expectations: Washington, Beijing, and the North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 18, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 7-29. 
13 Scobell 2004, 14; Thomas L. Friedman, “Brussels Sprouts,” New York Times, May 11, 
2005, A19. 
14 Krawitz 2003, 1. 
15 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement 
Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 165. 
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policy.  The most common element of this argument is that Beijing is using a 
Ukrainian model for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula while the United 
States seeks the Libyan model.16  The Ukrainian model refers to the international 
incentive method used to entice Kiev into relinquishing the nuclear weapons it 
inherited upon the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Basically, as applied to Korea, 
the model seeks to “maintain peace on the Peninsula, resolve the crisis through 
dialogue rather than military pressure or sanctions, and oppose nuclear 
weapons.”17  Based on the successful coercion against Libya’s burgeoning 
nuclear program, the Libyan model calls for sanctions and military pressures 
against North Korea.  Another assertion is that Beijing practices Realpolitik with 
Chinese Characteristics, adopting neither realism nor liberalism as its 
international political models, but a hybrid model.  By this logic, Beijing acts 
reactively and in a disciplined manner, neither seeking hegemony nor 
expansionism.18  John Park points out another interesting element in China’s 
approach, and that of every nation in the Six Party Talks, that the “foreign 
ministries working on the Six Party Talks are not Northeast Asian specialists . . . 
they are Americanists.”  In other words, China’s approach in this matter is not to 
fix the nuclear problem so much as to “discourage a U.S. misadventure.”19  A 
Chinese writer points out that Beijing holds a “three no’s principle: no nuclear 
weapons, no war, and no chaos.”20 
The fifth argument contends that Beijing has influence in Pyongyang, but 
its goals are truly one-sided, towards Beijing’s national security objectives, to the 
                                            
16 Denny Roy, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Beijing’s Pyongyang Problem and Seoul’s 
Hope,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 3, no. 1 (January 2004), http://www.apcss.org.;  
John S. Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six Party Talks,”  The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 
(Autumn 2005): 75-91.    
17 Roy 2004, 3. 
18 Laura Renner, “The Growing Relationship Between South Korea and China: 
Consequences for North Korea: (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006).  
19 An Americanist refers to an academic or political analyst that deals on issues surrounding 
the United States.  Park 2005, 88. 
20 Zheng Shenxia, “China’s Peaceful Development and Asia-Pacific Security,” The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis 18, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 171-181. 
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detriment of others.  Stephen Blank compiles a list of scenarios that compose an 
“evil China” model that includes a call to arms that “ROK’s and Russia’s 
rapprochements with China represent a significant loss of political support for 
Washington to China and should raise serious concern in America.” 21  Blank’s 
article sites Yi Xiaoxiong as declaring Beijing’s goals as “transforming North 
Korea into a large economic development zone for China” and “to reduce the 
American influence in South Korea.”22  A less distressing and negative assertion 
says Beijing’s “ultimate objective is to ensure a Korean Peninsula friendly to its 
interest and great-power politics in Northeast Asia significantly less hostile to its 
rise.”23  An even less devastating argument, proffered by Eric Teo Chu Cheow, 
says China is coming “full circle after 320 years” to quietly take its position of 
preeminence on the Korean peninsula.  Cheow recalls historical memory to 
suggest that Beijing’s actions during the crisis are nothing more than the natural 
flow of relationships in the region back to China as the hegemon.24   
The sixth and last argument makes the assertion that Beijing has nearly 
unlimited influence in Pyongyang and refuses to use it.  This argument is 
premised on a U.S.-centric policy and contends that China is single-handedly 
thwarting the peace process.  Those who argue this are not academics and 
include politicians.  Referring to China’s ongoing role in the crisis, Senator Arlen 
Specter contends that, “China could do more, having had such a long-standing 
relationship with North Korea, to help the negotiations.”25  The Senator from 
Pennsylvania was quick to point out that although Beijing has taken some steps, 
including establishing the Six Party Talks, he believes it could certainly influence 
                                            
21 Stephen Blank, “The End of the Six-Party Talks?” Strategic Insights 6, no 1 (January 
2007), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/. 
22 Blank 2007. 
23 Yong Deng, “China and the Six-Party Talks,” Korea and world Affairs 30, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 
361-378. 
24 Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “The North Korean Missile and Nuclear Crises: China’s Historic and 
Strategic Stakes on the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 18, no. 4 
(Winter 2006): 31-50. 
25 “U.S. Senators Press China on Iran, North Korea,” Defense News, August 11, 2006, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2017022&C=america. 
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Pyongyang to a peaceful conclusion.  His reference to past friendship between 
the two countries exemplifies the argument in this camp that China and North 
Korea are close and Beijing is holding back in the process.  Senator John 
McCain points out that China, as an emerging power in the world, must do more 
to support peace and the denuclearization of the peninsula.  “If they’re going to 
be a superpower in the world, they’re going to have to act like it.”26  This camp 
leans heavily on the contention that China wishes to become a superpower – that 
it will operate and look similar to that of the United States, and that Beijing is 
clearly not playing its part in this crisis.  One author points out in an article in the 
Asia Times that these arguments are “not wrong in its overall assessment of 
China’s role in these negotiations . . . the effectiveness or limitations of the ‘China 
Card’ will only be determined by China.”27  Thomas L. Friedman, famed New 
York Times columnist summarizes this argument with his own statement: 
All China has to say to Kim Jong Il is: “You will shut down your 
nuclear weapons program and put all of your reactors under 
international inspection, or we will turn off your lights, cut off your 
heat, and put your whole country on a diet. Have we made 
ourselves clear?”28  
 This thesis argues that China’s influence over Pyongyang is wholly 
coercive in nature, that concerns associated with the crisis are limited by Beijing-
led initiatives as well as pre-existing conditions, and that these two conditions 
combine to allow Beijing certain latitude to exploit the North Korean crisis for 
diplomatic, economic and security advantages.  To demonstrate this, this thesis 
first rebuts arguments that Beijing is crippled by its fears or that these fears drive 
how it responds to the crisis.  Second, it argues that evidence of China’s 
relationship with and coercive influence over North Korea show Beijing is capable  
                                            
26 “McCain: Pressure From China Key to North Korea Threat,” NewsMax.com Wires, October 
19, 2006, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/10/18/171635.shtml. 
27 Ehsan Ahrari,  “Paying China for Pressuring Pyongyang,” Asia Times Online, October 28, 
2004,  http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FJ28Ad03.html. (accessed February 2007). 
28 Friedman, Thomas, “Brussels Sprouts,” New York Times, May 11, 2005, A19. 
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of taking action and will do so for its own interests.  The final portion argues that 
China exploits the crisis to its own advantage.  Each chapter addresses one of 
the three main targets of the thesis.   
Chapter II identifies the four specific concerns for Beijing caused by North 
Korea’s actions and explains how existing conditions combined with Chinese-led 
initiatives help constrain their effect.  The four concerns are: that North Korea 
may initiate regional nuclear proliferation, starting with Japan; that Japan will 
reemerge as an aggressive state; that the Kim regime will collapse, leaving 
China’s northeastern border exposed to U.S. forces; and finally that Washington 
will take preemptive actions, initiating a regional conflict.  The main point of this 
chapter is that Beijing has greater freedom of maneuver in responding to the 
North Korean crisis than is generally believed.  
Chapter III assessed Beijing’s four most significant policy options and the 
coercive influential capability it enjoys over Pyongyang.  By assessing the four 
main policy options, this chapter shows that Beijing’s best choice requires that it 
take a leading role and use the situation to meet goals advantageous to China.  
This chapter also surveys the extent of Beijing’s influence over Pyongyang and 
its willingness to exert it to meet those advantageous goals.  Like the most 
prevalent argument in the literature, this thesis contends that China maintains a 
coercive, or threatening, relationship over Pyongyang but goes beyond the 
literature in asserting Beijing has the political will to exert that influence.      
Chapter IV evaluates China’s advantages in the crisis.  The major 
advantages that Beijing seeks in the crisis are increased regional leadership, 
increased economic development, and concessions on the Taiwan issue.  
Increasing regional leadership and hegemony requires first limiting Washington’s 
influence in the region as well as disrupting the alliance system, isolating Japan 
and limiting Tokyo’s regional influence, enhancing current security arrangements, 
improving the military’s size and modernity and gaining influence in the future 
Korean unification.  Economic development and economic primacy in North 
Korea require increased investment in China’s Northeastern region, providing the 
 9
cheapest regional labor, maintaining primary economic influence in North Korea, 
and limiting economic competition with its neighbors.  Finally, North Korea is a 
negotiation chip for concessions with respect to Taiwan and the crisis limits 
Washington’s strategic flexibility and focus.  The conclusion of this chapter is 
simply that Beijing benefits from a continued non-violent crisis on the Korean 
peninsula.     
Washington praises Beijing’s efforts in the crisis while demanding more at 
every turn.  Beijing seems the most capable of affecting Pyongyang and yet only 
on occasion does it seek to do so.  Washington and Beijing may sit at the same 
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II. THE DRAGON IS NOT AFRAID 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The plutonium-based small-scale explosion in North Korea on October 9, 
2006, triggered more than just the 4.2 on a Richter scale.  For Beijing, it was 
another harbinger of danger to its three-decade long economic expansion as a 
regional conflict thwarts Beijing's efforts toward growth and national security.  
North Korea seems poised to make that concern a reality.  The nuclear crisis 
arguably highlights four specific security concerns for the growing dragon.  The 
first concern is the beginning of a nuclear domino effect.  Japan is the next 
domino expected to fall with repercussions on regional security, including an 
eventual nuclear Taiwan.  Second is the concern for a reemerging militarist 
Japan.  In its quest for deterrence, Japan may rearm (physically and legally) 
triggering a more expansive regional arms race or worse.  Third is the concern 
for a Kim regime collapse, as it offers only negative outcomes for China’s 
national security.  Finally, Beijing is concerned with a U.S.-led preemptive attack.  
The Bush administration policy of preemptive defense threatens to destabilize 
the region by initiating a war on China’s border.  Beijing is not concerned with the 
specific issue of the crisis but rather the consequences of the mostly symbolic 
gesture that is the North Korean nuclear weapon.29  Moreover, while each 
specific concern is legitimate in its own right, there are several international 
factors, as well as Beijing-led initiatives, that limit the impact of the crisis on 
Chinese national security. 
This chapter counters the most prevalent argument that the nuclear crisis 
endangers Beijing, crippling it with fear, and renders the state incapable of 
acting.  Between pre-existing international conditions and Beijing’s diplomatic, 
economic and military engagement, the four major security concerns quickly fade 
                                            
29 John S. Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six Party Talks.”  The Washington Quarterly 28, 
no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 75-91.    
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to relative insignificance.  Each section of this chapter identifies and discusses a 
major concern followed by an analysis of efforts and conditions that minimize the 
threat.   
B. NUCLEAR DOMINO EFFECT 
Also known as the “nuclear cascade,” the nuclear domino effect refers to 
the possibility that other states in the Northeast Asian region will adopt nuclear 
weapons as a viable deterrent to the North Korean threat.  Much like a game of 
stacking dominos for a falling wave, the initiator is the first push.  In this case, 
Pyongyang is the first domino.  Specifically, the argument follows that Beijing 
fears Japan is next, followed by South Korea, and then ultimately Taiwan.  Japan 
sits at what Kurt Campbell calls the “nuclear tipping point.”30  The argument that 
Tokyo is likely the next to go nuclear is based on three factors: eroding security, 
pride and prestige, and technical availability.   
The ”eroding security” factor focuses first on North Korea’s developing 
nuclear weapons and testing medium and long-range missiles amidst 
international scrutiny, displaying Pyongyang’s lack of sensitivity to international 
confluence and propriety.  North Korea has proceeded to test the Taepo-Dong 
and No-Dong missiles in the East Sea, threatening Tokyo and Japanese 
interests.   
The second factor eroding security is the perceived collapse of the U.S. 
umbrella.  The security treaties signed throughout the decades since 1950 
created an umbrella of support that in the event of attack, the U.S. would 
respond, in-kind, against the aggressor.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the United States redistributed its forces away from the region, giving Japan the 
sense that a depleting conventional umbrella means a depleting nuclear 
umbrella.  If the United States is not there with conventional forces, it may not be 
there with a nuclear or tactical counter-strike.  In September 2006, prior to North 
                                            
30 Kurt M. Campbell, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear 
Choices (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004). 
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Korea’s underground test, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone held a 
press conference over the nuclear question.  He told reporters: 
Whether or not the United States (which has provided Japan with a 
nuclear umbrella) will maintain the same attitude is unpredictable.  
There is a need to study the option of nuclear weapons.31 
During the Cold War, the United States and Japan shared the same fear 
of a nuclear attack from the USSR.  Today, Japan’s chief nuclear threat is North 
Korea, a nation with very few delivery methods.  One missile, the Taepo-Dong II, 
which supposedly can reach the United States mainland, experienced two failed 
launches.  The 1998 test failed to put a satellite into orbit, and the 2006 launch 
exploded 45 seconds into flight.  In essence, the United States and Japan do not 
share the same fear from a nuclear North Korea.  In fact, Japan may see that the 
United States will resist attacking North Korea with a nuclear weapon following 
any attack on Japan for fear of international reprisal and further North Korean 
attacks against neighboring countries.  Japan finds itself in a Gaullist situation, 
asking repeatedly if America will risk the life of one Californian for the sake of 
Tokyo. 
Beijing is the culprit for Japan’s third perceived security concern.  More 
than just the unprecedented economic growth, China's growing military prowess 
also threatens Japan.  China is increasing its military efficiency, updating its 
weapons technology, and improving nuclear weapon delivery systems.  A report 
released in 2003 showed that China spent twice as much on its military than 
openly reported.  China “believes it imperative to vigorously pursue the 
modernization of its military” and “believes that its military strength should be 
proportionate to its national power.” 32  In essence, China will increase its military 
capability to meet the growing economy.33     
                                            
31 “Nakasone Calls For Studying Option of Arming Japan with Nuclear Weapons,” Tokyo 
Shimbun (translated), September 6, 2006. 
32  Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy At The Crossroads (Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2005), 107. 
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In this faltering sense of security, Japan has little recourse.  Tokyo’s past 
method of economic deterrence proved ineffective.  For example, in 1995, China 
continued to test nuclear weapons despite requests from Japan to cease the 
activity.  Tokyo hoped to discourage the tests by threatening removal of 
economic aid (a projected $5 billion (U.S.) for the period 1996-2001) but China 
did not respond as the Japanese had hoped.34  Other than a strong trade 
relationship, Japan no longer holds a position of economic assertion over China.  
While Beijing welcomes this, it may regret that it has upended a Japanese sense 
of security.  These several real and perceived security issues represent one 
model for Japanese ascension as a nuclear state.     
Pride and prestige are essential for states hoping to lead the region and 
this second argument may help explain why some fear Japan will adopt nuclear 
weapons.  Japan has been an economic powerhouse for decades and even 
during the 1996 economic crisis, Tokyo maintained a trade surplus over the 
United States.  Two major events thin its pride in East Asia.  First, China's 
emergence as the new economic power slowly usurps Japan’s status, and 
second, Japan’s desire to take a lead in world politics is constantly 
overshadowed.   
China’s economic prowess threatens to overshadow Japan in the coming 
decades.  There is always a struggle for power in East Asia.  There is only ever 
one hegemon in the region at a time - “One mountain cannot accommodate two 
tigers.”35  China was the largest power for many centuries, until 1894 when 
Japan proved victorious in the first Sino-Japanese War.  Japan led the region, 
asserting itself on Korea and China, defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese 
War, and expanding throughout the Pacific until its defeat in World War II.  The 
United States exerted itself as the East Asia hegemon with military power while 
Japan developed economically.  Japan took a superior economic position, 
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number two economy in the world, by the 1980’s.  Recent years showed slower 
growth.  As the Japanese economy slows and China swells into the position of 
economic leadership, Japan may feel a certain loss in status and prestige.   
A significant amount of pride rests in protecting its own citizens.  As North 
Korea continuously defies international pressures and threatens Japan’s security, 
Tokyo may feel a twinge of pride and attempt to exert more power in the 
situation.  This is evidenced by its insistence on resolving abduction issues with 
North Korea prior to any submission to agreements spawned in the six-party 
talks.  Moreover, Pyongyang’s threats combined with Tokyo’s reliance on the 
United States for deterrence certainly stresses that Japan lacks the full extent of 
desired domestic security capability.  To make up for this, Japan also stresses its 
global prestige.   
Tokyo seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC).  Its 
robust donations to the United Nations combined with relatively recent 
peacekeeping operations in several regions show its global capacity and 
partnership.  A veto-wielding vote in the UNSC is tantamount for securing its 
future against a Beijing consensus, or a perceived Beijing-led coalition of United 
Nations voters.  Unfortunately, China and South Korea do not back the Japanese 
ascension as a permanent member, which damages its pride and limits its 
prestige.  The United States offered support, politely asking that China back 
Japan’s bid and promising to “strongly support” the bid itself.36  The five current 
permanent members of the council are nuclear powers; therefore, Japan may 
see a correlation between the two and seek nuclear weapons to this end.  As 
Japanese pride and prestige suffer blows and setbacks it may seek an alternate 
route to restore itself as a regional and global leader via the nuclear route. 
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The third major nuclear argument follows that Japan’s nuclear hedging is 
a sign that it may adopt nuclear weapons because it has the technical means to 
do so.  The premise here is that a nation which has the technical means for 
acquiring nuclear weapons will develop them; having the capability will ultimately 
lead to the capacity.  Nuclear hedging, “a national strategy lying between nuclear 
pursuit and nuclear rollback,”37 brought the peaceful and non-nuclear state to a 
within a reasonable timeline in acquiring nuclear weapons.  The United Kingdom 
found in early 1993, that “Japan has key bomb making components, including 
plutonium and electronic triggers and has expertise to go nuclear very quickly.”38  
Japan will possess a plutonium stockpile greater than 145 metric tons by 2020, 
far exceeding the 100 tons in the United States.  Even today, Japan possesses 
over 45 kilograms of weapons grade fissile material and 45 tons of stockpiled 
plutonium.39   Japan also out-sources its plutonium reprocessing, with several 
tons in Great Britain, Germany, and France.  Furthermore, Japan developed a 
uranium enrichment program, which also creates weapons grade fissile material.  
The estimated amount of weapons-grade plutonium necessary for a nuclear 
weapon is as low as four kilograms,40 which puts Japan’s possible yield for 
nuclear weapons at approximately ten using high-grade refined plutonium, and 
hundreds using low-grade plutonium.   
Japan nearly has a delivery system.  In February 1994, it launched the H-
2 rocket, built with domestic technology, placing a satellite into orbit.  This 
technology readily adapts for military purposes.  Japan also worked with solid-
fuel rocket systems comparable to U.S. ICBMs, which transport nuclear 
                                            
37  Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International 
Security 27, no. 3 (2002): 59. 
38  T. V. Paul, Power versus prudence: why nations forgo nuclear weapons (New York: 
Queens University Press, 2000): 51. 
39 Barnaby, Frank and Burnie, Shaun.  “Thinking the Unthinkable: Japanese Nuclear Power 
and Proliferation in East Asia.”  Citizen’s Nuclear Information Center.  (August 2005), 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefings/Japanreport.pdf. 
40  Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005): 47. 
 17
weapons.41  Japanese nuclear hedging includes the fact that the large reserve of 
weapons grade plutonium, enriched uranium, electronic triggers, and comparable 
delivery methods remain separated.  However, in a matter of three to six months, 
Japan could turn its capability to a hard fact of ownership. 
China witnesses Japan’s nuclear hedging, its search for pride and 
prestige, and possibly understands its perceived security erosion, but historical 
memory links these factors to the overall fear of a nuclear Japan.  Japanese 
atrocities in China during World War II are common knowledge for Chinese 
citizens.  Older generations pass stories to younger generations and propagate 
the anger.  Anger over former Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine highlight the continued frustration and concern over Japan’s militarist 
past.42  For concerned Chinese, a worst-case scenario places Japan with just 
such a destructive weapon and a means to deliver it against other countries. 
A nuclear Japan also disturbs South Korea, which shares the historical 
memory with China over Japanese atrocities.  Not to be left wanting of security, 
surrounded by China, North Korea and a newly nuclear Japan, South Korea 
would, as the argument goes, surely prove the next domino.  To back that 
argument, Lee Hoe Chang, once head of the Grand National Party, pushed for 
an investigation into the “utility of nuclear weapons” to “counter North Korea and 
a nuclearized Japan.”43  It appears that the specter of a nuclear enemy to the 
north was not enough to sway South Korean discussion until Japan entered the 
equation.      
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Finally, another nightmarish issue presents itself in Taiwan.  “The real 
horrors of nuclear proliferation in Asia lie … in Taiwan.”44  The China-Taiwan 
issue is well known and precarious.  China maintains a robust military presence 
and threat over Taiwan but a nuclear weapon would destabilize the current status 
quo.  Part of the Chinese Communist Party legitimacy rests on its commitment to 
eventually reunify Taiwan under Beijing’s control.  A nuclear weapon might 
empower the Taiwanese to finally declare independence, determining that 
mutually assured destruction deters Beijing from attacking Taipei.  China will not 
allow this and will stop at nothing to discourage diplomatically, economically, and 
militarily any domino effect that leads to Taiwan adopting nuclear weapons. 
Nevertheless, is the nuclear domino effect a legitimate fear?  Japan’s 
domestic politics does not support legally or popularly a nuclear weapons 
arsenal.  Japan adopted its non-negotiable non-nuclear policy quickly.  In 1957, 
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi resigned under pressure when he stated that 
Japan had opted not to seek nuclear weapons despite that, “it was not 
unconstitutional for it to do so.”45  Public opinion against nuclear weapons was 
too strong to support even a discussion.  Prime Minister Sato's similarly 
controversial statements in 1965 prompted the Three Non-Nuclear Principles – 
“that Japan would not manufacture, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear 
weapons onto Japanese soil.”46  Three months later, Sato developed the Four 
Nuclear Policies: 
1. Promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
2. Efforts toward global nuclear disarmament 
3. Reliance and dependence on U.S. extended deterrence 
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4. Support for the Three Non-Nuclear Principles under the 
circumstances where Japan’s national security is guaranteed by the 
other three policies.47 
Furthermore, Sato ordered the 1968/1970 Report, which researched the 
costs and benefits of nuclear weapons.  The report found: the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella was sufficient to support the needs of Japan and South Korea; that a 
small nuclear arsenal was extremely vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes; and 
gaining a nuclear weapon would ostracize the still growing nation against the 
international community.48  While Japan discussed and even researched the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, its pacifist popular opinion ruled against it.  Every 
Prime Minister since Sato reaffirmed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the 
Four Nuclear Policies, keeping the nuclear argument shallow for several 
decades.   
The utter destruction incurred on the citizenry created anti-militarist norms 
that shaped the country’s foreign policy.  This argument refers to the nuclear 
allergy of the World War II generation and its desire for pacifism.  Scholars point 
out that the constructivist paradigm, which argues social norms will lead to the 
next generational norms, created a pacifist identity in Japan, which remains 
pervasive to current times.49  This is evident in the low public opinion for 
obtaining nuclear weapons and the strong opinion towards pacifism that 
continues in Japanese society despite the outcry against North Korea.  The 
popular nuclear allergy prefers avoiding nuclear weapons at all costs.     
The region faced nuclear activity in the past without the outbreak of war, 
an arms race or further proliferation.  Russia introduced nuclear weapons in 1949 
and China tested its first in 1964 without Northeast Asian regional despair.  South 
Korea admitted conducting limited nuclear testing in 2004 and North Korea freely 
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bragged of its nuclear capability as early as 2005 without sparking an immediate 
violent response.  The test in 2006 did not spark a preemptive attack or initiate 
Japan’s nuclear program as feared.  Simple geography of weapons is not 
enough to press Japan and the region into a nuclear arms race. 
Finally, Japan faces several international calls that seek to keep the island 
chain non-nuclear.  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Tokyo soon 
after the October 9 test to confirm America’s historical commitment to collective 
defense and the U.S. nuclear umbrella.50  Chinese Foreign Minister, Liu 
Jianchao, also openly reminded Japan of its historical position.  He specifically 
“called for Japan to stick to its ‘three non-nuclear principles’ and adopt a 
responsible attitude to safeguard regional peace and stability.”51  President Bush 
also expressed concern over Japanese discussion of nuclear weapons while 
Wen Jiabao applauded Abe’s more conservative tone.52  Japan’s largest and 
most influential neighbors are so obviously concerned that Japan cannot take the 
next step.  Michael Green points out that “an independent nuclear capability 
would destroy the U.S. nuclear umbrella and ultimately render Japan less safe” 
making the initial fear a reality.53  A PRC scholar re-enforces that point stressing, 
“there is no need to indulge in blind pessimism” as Japan does not wish to “erode 
the U.S. alliance system.”54  The former director general of the JDA, Ishiba 
Shigeru, also pointed out: 
 
                                            
50 “Japan: PM’s Hard Line Stance On N. Korea Toes the U.S. Line,” Global Information 
Network, (Oct 26, 2006): 1. 
51 Sun Shang Wu, “Restraint is Best Way to Ease Tension,” China Daily, Oct 18, 2006. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-10/18/content_710570.htm.  
52 Christopher W. Hughes, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear 
Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” Asia Policy 3 (January 2007), 78. 
53 Michael J. Green, “Future Visions of Asian Security: The Five Rings,” Asia Policy 3 
(January 2007).   
54 Shen Dingli, “Considerations Behind DPRK’s Nuclear Test,” Qingnian Cankau (translated), 
Sep 5, 2006. 
 21
If we develop nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount to saying 
we don’t trust the nuclear deterrence of the United States…We 
thereby could make enemies out of both  the U.S. and China, 
which is the scariest scenario.55 
Recognizing this conundrum, Secretary of State Rice “offered an emphatic 
guarantee” that “Japan’s security is the United States’ security.”56  Japan is not 
interested in exchanging its “comfortable position” under the U.S. umbrella for 
nuclear weapons.57  At this point, the nuclear dominos may be stuck on North 
Korea and it will take more than tests and aggressive talk from the peninsula to 
tilt Japan.    
C. MILITARIZED JAPAN 
The second major concern attributed to the Korean nuclear crisis is that it 
may spark a reemergence of a militarized Japan.  Referring again to historical 
memory, China, South Korea and every country in the region still remember the 
horrors inflicted by Japanese soldiers.  This argument stresses that the unstable 
North Korean situation forces a new look at the old ways and Japan may 
consider becoming a “normal country.”   
Similar to the nuclear debate, the creation of the military is a deep-rooted 
argument.  The 1946 peace constitution, specifically Article 9, technically, and 
literally, makes an Army or Military illegal.  Pacifists in Japan continue support for 
the position that the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) is unconstitutional.  
They stand on three arguments.  First, is the legalist point of view; the 
constitution specifically outlaws any military force.  Second is whether 
deterrence, a large military combined with a security relationship with the U.S., 
will entangle Japan in an unwanted conflict.  Third is a debate on whether a 
democratically elected government can avoid becoming the feared militaristic 
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Japan.58  Today the argument against an offensive military focuses on the 
protection offered and promised by Washington.  The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
of 1951 hinted the notion of this protection and the 1960 Treaty of Security and 
Mutual Cooperation between the U.S. and Japan provided clearly stipulated legal 
obligations on the United States to protect Japan.59  Since this time, Japan 
became the model of restraint in world crises and in military development.  The 
“culture of anti-militarism” that developed following WWII forced Japan into a 
“highly restrained foreign policy” and Japan chose to “forswear the development 
of offensive military forces.”60  However, North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests 
threaten to overturn 60 years of peaceful Japanese policy. 
North Korea can attack Japan, and Tokyo takes these threats seriously.  
The DPRK’s delivery capability is somewhat limited, as it relies on medium and 
long-range missiles, but effectively destructive.  In July 2006, Pyongyang tested 
the No-Dong missile (as well as several others) over the East Sea.  The No-Dong 
has a range of approximately 1500 km, putting Japan well within the range of a 
1200 kg weapon system.  Japan has less than ten minutes warning between 
launch in North Korea (assuming a radar or imagery observed launch) and 
impact on Japanese soil.61  There is an inherent danger that 80 percent of the 
Japanese population sits on 20 percent of the land and an accurate hit on a 
populated area could produce mass casualties.  The 200 known missiles62 
deployed in North Korea, even with low relative accuracy, can cause catastrophic 
damage to the population and industry.  Also in continuous production is the  
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Taepo-Dong long-range ballistic missile – another of those tested in July.  With a 
range of 6000-9000 miles, the missile can target all Japanese cities and parts of 
the U.S. coastline.63   
With only a few minutes warning, Japan desires the opportunity to 
respond preemptively against missile sites.  Shinzo Abe stated openly that Japan 
needed to explore the capabilities and reserved the right to a preemptive strike 
defense.  The head of the defense agency, Fukushiro Nukaga, echoed those 
sentiments.64  “North Korea’s ability to hold Japan hostage in its effort to deter 
the United States is a primary reason Japanese policymakers have revisited the 
idea of acquiring offensive strike capabilities.”65  This is a dramatic change in the 
Japanese philosophy of pacifism that prevailed for 60 years.   
Contrary to the low polls for nuclear weapons, the opinion polls in August 
2006 show 21.8 percent believe Japan should possess a preemptive strike 
capability and 29.2 percent believe Japan should consider such a capability for a 
total of 51 percent approval rating for seeking, discussing, or having a 
preemptive strike capability.66  Just as significant, Japanese public opinion of 
North Korea continues deteriorating.  Recent polls in Japan found 88 percent of 
the respondents felt “negativity” towards North Korea with 78 percent believing 
North Korea is a military threat to Japan.67  The increased public opinion for 
increasing military offensive capability, combined with the public perception of the 
threat, is not an earth-shattering majority, but still encouraging for those in the 
Diet intent on “normalizing” the state.    
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Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force is dual purpose and appears to possess a 
strike capability.  Japan’s inventory of current attack capable fighters is 45 
Mitsubishi F-2 variants (strikingly similar to the U.S. F-16) and 158 U.S. made F-
15J Eagles.68  For note of reference, the 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak 
Nuclear facility used older models of the F15s and F16s to a very successful 
end.69  Japan acquired systems for defending the islands against invasion.  
Therefore, the Army maintains very few tanks, considering the manpower is as 
large as the United Kingdom,70 but a very robust Air Force capable of attacking 
ground targets.  Furthermore, the JSDF is developing a more robust airborne 
radar jamming capability - a necessity against the thorough North Korean coastal 
air defense.  The combat power is not all-inclusive as the air power cannot attack 
without reliable targeting information.    
Japan understands this importance and is improving its domestic 
intelligence capability.  The first intelligence satellite launched in 2003.  In 
September 2006, Japan launched its third intelligence satellite, not quite reaching 
the original goal of eight by the end of the year.71  The first two were imagery 
platforms, with one being a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capable of collecting 
imagery despite adverse weather conditions.  The third is a suspected imagery 
platform as well.72  Japan also has a robust airborne Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) capability.  Its collection platforms 
routinely collect electronic order of battle (EOB), the “location of each detected 
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signal emitter and the parameters of the signals.”73  The EOB determines the 
locations of missile sites, command and control sites, and air defense radars as 
well as changes in patterns.  The SIGINT/ELINT capability, combined with the 
Imagery capability, gives Japan the necessary edge for identification and tracking 
North Korean missile launch sites and provides the early warning necessary for 
determining an eminent attack.   
North Korean targets, while well protected, are not as prolific as believed.  
As stated before, the DPRK has over 200 No-Dong Missiles, but, according to 
unclassified reporting, North Korea may only have as many as 50 launchers.74  
The No-Dong missile is liquid fueled, as is the Taepo-Dong and SCUD variants, 
meaning the missiles are not mission ready.  The fuel and the oxidizer are kept 
separate, due to the volatility of the mixture, and fueling a missile for launch 
takes several hours.  The U.S. intelligence community identified the fueling 
process prior to the launches in 2006, giving the international community ample 
warning for the event.  It seems plausible that Japan is slowly assuming a more 
offensive role for deterrence capabilities.   
Even with the technical capability and some shifting public opinions, is a 
reemerging militarized Japan a feasible concern for the region?  If Japan does 
opt for a preemptive strike capability, it risks three key factors.  First, there is no 
guarantee of total success and despite the size and quality of the Air Forces, the 
JSDF is not prepared for such an offensive role.  Secondly, the DPRK may 
launch a series of reprisal attacks, and third, developing the capability brings 
condemnation from the international community – counter to Japan’s global 
leadership aspirations. 
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As stated above, Japan has three imagery satellites in orbit as of 
September 2006.  There is no guarantee, however, that the three are operating 
perfectly or that all three are specifically oriented on North Korea.  Moreover, 
China’s successful downing of a satellite in 2007 emphasizes intelligence 
satellite vulnerability.  Even with functioning collection assets, Japan may miss 
several launchers.  What if the intelligence is old and some launchers have 
moved?  Suppose Japan launches a preemptive strike against all 50 launchers, 
and only destroys 40, the other 10 targets surviving due to pilot error, intelligence 
failures, or DPRK air defense success.  At this point, Japan could face at least 10 
launchers and the remaining missiles would undoubtedly target Tokyo.  At that 
point, Japan would need the missile defense capability against the reprisal 
attack.   
Reportedly, the PAC-3, the desired missile defense system, maintains it 
has a 92% success ratio.75  However, other reports consider it a much lower 
success rate.  In Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, the PAC-3 mistook two 
friendly aircraft for incoming missiles – showing its immaturity as a trustworthy 
system.76  Japan’s initial desire for a preemptive strike is the destruction of 
missile sites to protect its cities from eminent attack.  If the preemptive attack 
fails, its situation could be wholly reliant on a less than perfect missile defense 
system. 
The JSDF is not prepared for such a mission or a war.  According to the 
Japan Defense Agency, its annual defense budget steadily decreased since 
2001 and the projected mid-term defense program out to 2009 will decrease by 
3.08 percent.77  Procuring necessary equipment, training on the new equipment, 
and flight time for pilots drops significantly with less spending and places Japan  
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at a disadvantage.  Even if spending increased immediately, Japan is wholly 
incapable of launching an attack until it acquires the in-flight refueling capability 
scheduled for late 2008.78    
Second, Japan’s actions would escalate the region to war.  North Korea 
has repeatedly threatened turning Seoul into a “sea of fire.”  Japan’s preemptive 
strike could lend confidence to Kim Jong Il to launch an unprecedented artillery, 
missile, and air attack against Seoul and Tokyo.  The reprisal attacks would cost 
millions of lives in conventional warfare alone.  North Korea’s suspected nine 
nuclear weapons could also come into play.  Japan is unwilling and unable to 
absorb these attacks and accept the ruin to its economic strength and source of 
its current power and prestige.   
Third, the threat of international retaliation against Japanese aggression is 
more than the Japanese can bear.  Japan only recently emerged from its 
economic slump caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the bursting 
housing market.  Japanese exports to the United States, China, and South Korea 
amounted to over $451 billion, and it cannot afford to lose those markets.  
Furthermore, any attempts to enter the Security Council as a permanent member 
are lost against the retribution of current members, mainly China, Russia and 
possibly the United States.   
Even the recent discussions by the Japanese Diet created general anger 
in the region with the Chinese vocalizing mistrust of Japanese decision makers.  
Peter Hays Gries points out that the Peoples Daily published a “scathing” 
editorial entitled “Japan, Do Not Do Stupid Things” that admonished Tokyo’s 
aggressive discussions.  It inspired several anti-Japanese books and articles of 
similar title and substance.79  Even Japanese acquisition of Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) from the United States invokes Chinese concern and anger.  As 
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one author puts it, “First the shield, then the sword,” highlighting Beijing’s worry 
that Japan will foolishly rush in to an arms race.80   
It is not feasible for Japan to acquire a preemptive strike capability to 
counter the North Korean nuclear crisis despite the acquisition of in-flight 
refueling in 2008.  According to Daniel Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “debate 
on preemption against North Korea is mostly for domestic consumption as 
Japanese politicians and policymakers seek to establish their credentials as 
tough leaders.”81  Talk of preemption seems geared mostly towards courting the 
rising popular opinion for such a capability.  More importantly, “the Yoshida 
Doctrine has been institutionalized in ways that make sharp discontinuity less 
likely than continued incremental change,”82 and Japanese voters are “not likely 
to reward excessive tilts by their leaders in one direction or another for long.”83  
One can expect that militant calls for preemptive strike offensive capability will 
slowly fade in favor for small-scale changes over time.  While there are 
arguments that this is a legitimate fear for Beijing, the overall message in China 
is one of confidence in Chinese superiority over Japan’s military, and Japan’s 
needless military growth.  Several Chinese authors point out that cooler heads 
will prevail in Japan.  The economic relationship Japan holds with China and 
other regional trading partners is too great  to risk on confrontation.84  Political, 
diplomatic and military discussions will actively prevent deterioration to unilateral 
action.85  The risks for Japan currently outweigh the gains and Beijing can rest 
assured that Japan is not on the offensive. 
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D. REGIME COLLAPSE SCENARIOS 
North Korea is a physical buffer between U.S. ground forces and the 
Chinese mainland and Beijing’s concern is that heavy-handed actions on 
Pyongyang (e.g., sanctions) will cause instability in the regime and eventual 
collapse.  There are two ways for North Korea to collapse, implosion or 
explosion.  An implosion model is the more peaceful means for the Kim regime 
collapse.  In this scenario, the regime loses legitimacy and dissolves or an 
internal revolution destroys the DPRK from within.  The United Nations, ROK and 
possibly the U.S. military might occupy North Korea as peacekeepers and 
attempt Korean reunification.  The explosion model, on the other hand, is a 
violent collapse.  In a last ditch effort for survival and domestic legitimacy, Kim 
Jong Il launches a massive artillery, missile and even nuclear attack on South 
Korea, Japan or even China.  The United States and ROK militaries would 
counterattack and occupy North Korea as conquerors and peacekeepers for 
nation building and eventual unification.  Both scenarios bode ill for China.  First, 
a collapse places the United States on China’s border for the first time since the 
Korean War.  Second, the incredible refugee flow would destabilize China’s 
northeastern region, and, third, war counteracts China’s economic growth.   
China does not want the United States military on its border.  Historically, 
the Korean peninsula served as a natural bridge and a launching point for 
Japanese attacks into mainland China.  The first time, 1592-1598, was a failed 
attempt by a newly unified and powerful Japan followed centuries later in the 
1890s as Japan flexed its regional power defeating the Chinese on the peninsula 
in 1895 and then the Russians at sea in 1905.86  Since World War II, Beijing 
went to great lengths keeping a buffer between itself and its enemies.  In 1950, 
Mao Zedong launched millions of Chinese volunteer soldiers into North Korea to  
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repel the U.S. military attack.  China lost an estimated 980,000 volunteers, 
including Mao’s son.  Since then, North Korea served as an excellent barrier 
between the Chinese and U.S. militaries.   
The second problem involved in a DPRK regime collapse is the massive 
refugee flow into China.  Even without a war, estimates of refugees (or illegal 
border crossers) in 2002 stood at 150,000 while 2003 estimates doubled the 
number escaping across the Yalu into China.87  The Yanbian Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture, directly north of the Yalu, is littered with closed and 
inoperable industrial plants throughout the area.  Unemployment in Yanbian is 
rampant with no social safety net, making domestic peace tenuous.  Moreover, 
the cultural Koreans in the area, the largest Korean diaspora population, prefers 
to speak Korean rather than the official Mandarin.88  An unexpected surge of 
refugees flooding across the border as the Kim regime collapsed would create 
significant issues for Beijing.  First, it cannot house, feed, employ and secure that 
many ethnic Koreans in an area already suffering severe unemployment and 
depressed economic conditions.  Second, the millions of ethnic Koreans legally 
living in the Yanbian area could undermine Chinese attempts to block the border.  
A mass Korean demonstration of “ethno-national conflict” against the Chinese 
government would make the situation chaotic.89  Third, the international 
community, specifically the Red Cross, doctors without borders, and other 
humanitarian non-governmental organizations, would find it necessary to explore 
China’s actions in refugee camps.  China does not enjoy entertaining external 
pressures that question its governance, sovereignty or actions.90  Based on 
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international law, as China is a signatory to international agreements on the 
treatment of refugees, the refugees would require better treatment than that 
given to rural Chinese.91  This would create another domestic dispute that China 
hopes to avoid.  Beijing has even gone to the extreme of conducting “refugee 
round-ups” throughout the Jilin Province, deporting the captured to North 
Korea.92  David Shambaugh points out that this “round-up” serves several 
purposes including reducing the embarrassment of embassy compound break-
ins by asylum seekers, reduces the second order effect of Pyongyang regime 
collapse caused by a mass exodus of citizenry, and placates North Korea who 
specifically requested the repatriation of so many refugees.93    
The third major concern pertains to the Chinese economy.  The explosion 
collapse scenario would severely damage the South Korean and Japanese 
economies.  Both countries invest billions in foreign direct investment in China 
and both are major trading partners.  The sudden withdrawal of South Korean 
foreign direct investment (FDI), for example, would “seriously undermine the 
Chinese leadership's ability to reach its 2020 economic development target.”94  In 
addition, the influx of refugees, as discussed above, would put a strain on the 
northern economy.  All the effects of a regional war would certainly idle, if not 
collapse, China’s impressive growth.   
Keeping the Kim regime afloat counters these arguments.  As Samuel Kim 
points out, “China’s foreign policy wish list with respect to its communist neighbor 
includes at least five ‘No’s:’ No instability, No collapse, No nukes, No refugees or 
defectors, and No conflict.”95  China provides a majority of North Korea’s food 
and fuel imports, supplying 70-90 percent of Pyongyang’s oil and over 40 percent 
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of its sustenance needs with very little reciprocal trade.96  Despite UN Resolution 
1718 calling for sanctions against North Korea, China was slow to impose border 
inspections or stem the flow of items onto the peninsula.  Beijing believes 
Pyongyang will survive longer based on its decisions not to enact an economic 
blockade.97  Often, the United States and Japan voice concerns and want China 
to stop oil and food shipments to North Korea until Kim Jong-Il ends the crisis.  
Yet Beijing does not heed the call despite having the capability to do so.  
Evidence suggests that Beijing stopped oil shipments to the DPRK in the past.   
In 2003, China stopped the flow for three days.  Supposedly, Chinese officials 
warned North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun that Pyongyang should not 
provoke the United States.  Soon afterward, the Daqing pipeline shutdown for 
what Beijing labeled “technical difficulties.”98  Immediately following the 
underground test in 2006, Beijing delayed shipments of oil until Pyongyang 
received Hu Jintao’s personal representative, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan.  
Soon after the meeting, Kim Jong-Il pledged no further tests in the near future.99  
Beijing is also willing to withhold support.  On occasion, China has suspended 
shipments of humanitarian aid because Pyongyang “regularly forgets to return 
railroad rolling stock.”100  China has the capability to shut all oil and goods 
flowing into North Korea, but it is not in Beijing’s interest to do so.  As Andrew 
Scobell points out, “China has a major stake in ensuring the continued survival of 
the North Korean regime and may be willing to go to considerable lengths to 
guarantee this.”101  Moreover, Beijing certainly recognizes that the United States, 
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Japan, South Korea, and Russia are reliant on China’s initiatives in resolving the 
crisis and thereby has the opportunity to act in its own self-interests. 
Beijing remains confident about Pyongyang’s survival.  Chinese 
investment in North Korea rose over the past five years with investment reaching 
$59 million in 2004, 85 percent of all foreign investment in the DPRK.102  One 
scathing Chinese commentary claimed that “conjectures” of DPRK collapse are 
distracting from the six-party talks, “insensitive” and a “left-over from the Cold 
War era.”   The report continues, “Certain western countries are always pinning 
their hopes on a DPRK regime collapse so as to win their game … but the base 
policy is mistaken and the chances of success extremely remote.”103  
E.   UNITED STATES OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
The final argument shows concern for a U.S.-led preemptive attack on 
North Korea, violently ending the nuclear crisis.  This argument surmises that 
even if North Korea does not initiate conflict, a war will still take place under the 
guise of preemptive defense.  An American assault will trigger an explosive 
collapse scenario, incite insurgent fighting, or draw the region to war.  Similar to 
the regime collapse scenario, China’s concerns include U.S. military forces on its 
border, mass refugee movements, and economic disruption in the region.   
President George W. Bush announced his philosophy on preemptive 
strike defense in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and later reaffirmed 
the strategy in the 2006 update.  In 2001, only weeks after the September 11 
terrorist attacks in New York City, the United States launched a major offensive 
on Afghanistan destroying the Taliban regime.  In March 2003, it attacked Iraq to 
overthrow a dictator, end a regime, and destroy weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  Operation Iraqi Freedom proved difficult to handle and threatens to 
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destabilize the Middle East region.  In this regard, Washington’s actions are 
inherently dangerous as it correlates to North Korea.  President Bush mentioned 
both Iraq and North Korea in his infamous “axis of evil” speech and one year later 
attacked Iraq.  The excuse to attack was WMD and North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons facilities and Yongbyong nuclear reactor certainly fit that description as 
well.   
That said, is it feasible for the United States to launch a preemptive strike 
or otherwise initiate an offensive against North Korea?  Over 170,000 soldiers, 
airmen, sailors and marines fight a difficult insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The press consistently reports how thinly stretched the military has become and 
it will take billions of dollars to recoup the Army when it finally vacates Iraq.  
President Bush lacks support in the Congress and the international community 
for almost every initiative.  U.S. bases in South Korea are pulling further south, 
away from the DMZ, to areas around Pusan.  One Chinese author attests that 
the U.S. will “definitely not attack the DPRK because China opposes it, the DPRK 
has nuclear weapons as an effective deterrence, the size of the DPRK ground 
forces are too large, and the U.S. military is busy elsewhere.”104   If Beijing 
recognizes these factors, then the specter of U.S. preemptive attack on North 
Korea loses its luster.  Washington’s actions in the past years make it difficult if 
not impossible to launch an offensive against North Korea.        
China’s reaction is also a major factor in curbing a preemptive strike 
option.  Beijing has not officially rescinded its defense treaty with the DPRK and 
yet has not openly stated that it will support North Korea in a war.  Ambiguity is a 
powerful deterrent against unilateral military action.  Washington must remain 
wary of China’s position in the matter and should not risk an accidental war from 
efforts designed to secure South Korea and Japan against Pyongyang’s nuclear 
weapons.  China is also proactive in keeping the United States military busy in 
other regions.  Reports surfaced showing China supplies Iraqi and Afghan 
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insurgents with weapons.105  While China is concerned with a U.S. preemptive 
strike or offensive move against North Korea, the current international situation 
combined with China’s posture and ambiguity successfully limits the danger. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
The North Korean nuclear crisis threatens to destabilize the region.  The 
United States and Japan are set on ending the crisis swiftly, removing nuclear 
weapons from the peninsula.  Washington projects fears on China and U.S. 
policy makers express exasperation towards Beijing’s inactivity to end the crisis.  
Literature identifies four major concerns surrounding the crisis: that it will spark a 
nuclear domino effect; that Japan will reemerge as a military power; that the Kim 
regime will collapse, exposing China’s border; and that the United States will 
launch a preemptive strike or conduct offensive operations.  While these 
concerns seem valid explanations for Chinese timidity in dealing with Pyongyang, 
this chapter showed that international conditions and Chinese actions dissipate 
the concerns rendering them toothless.  With the fears assuaged, the following 
questions remain.  Why does Beijing not take stronger Washington-like actions 
against Pyongyang?  What options does Beijing have in dealing with the issue in 
the most effective manner?  Does China have significant influence over the Kim 
regime?  Will Beijing exert that influence over a friend and communist brother?  
In the end, the region is wholly reliant on China to make the concerted effort in 
solving the crisis.   
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III.  BEIJING’S OPTIONS ARE OPEN 
During the first North Korean nuclear crisis, heating rapidly in 1993 and 
1994, Beijing did little to quell the rhetoric or cool tensions in the region.  
Eventually, North Korea and the United States signed the Agreed Framework 
and the crisis calmed considerably.  In 2002, when it erupted again, China 
emerged as a major bulwark for the region, stressing bi-lateral, then hosting tri-
lateral and finally multi-lateral talks to discern a feasible outcome.  Beijing is now 
a major player in the crisis.  What are Beijing’s options and is it capable of 
influencing the situation to favorable ends?  Why do China’s actions not follow 
the United States’ desires?   
This chapter briefly explains Beijing’s four policy options and then shows 
that China maintains the will and ability to influence Pyongyang for its own self 
interests.  The four options include, revive the “lips and teeth” closeness, taking a 
more hardline stance similar to the U.S. method, ignore the issue, or maintain a 
certain status quo and use the issue to its advantage.  After identifying the best 
policy option, a glimpse into the relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing 
shows that China holds a coercive influence and the political will to use that 
influence over its neighbor.   
A. OPTIONS     
The “lips and teeth” refers to China and North Korea’s past relationship.  It 
was often said by Beijing that if the lips are gone (referring to North Korea), the 
teeth would grow cold.  If Beijing and Pyongyang revived the old close 
relationship, similar to the days when Mao provided hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers in the Korean War, Beijing would enjoy several positive results.  First, 
the close relationship would ensure regime survival.  Food and fuel would 
continue to flow if not increase in quantity and quality, and the partnership could 
bolster the Kim regime’s domestic legitimacy.  Second, a very specific  guarantee  
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of military support would further deter a U.S. preemptive strike on North Korea.  
While this option avoids regime collapse and U.S. offensive action, it also holds 
dangerous consequences.   
In this option, China essentially isolates Japan in the region.  First, if China 
does not admonish North Korea for its threatening stance against Japan, Tokyo 
will rightfully see a delineation of states – those for and those against North 
Korea.  Second, Japan may feel the Sino-North Korean relationship further 
degrades the U.S. nuclear umbrella.  Washington may not reciprocate North 
Korean attacks, as promised to the Japanese, if China guarantees to attack 
America in return (as would be a possible outcome of the revived lips and teeth 
relationship).  This would notify the Japanese that the United States will not trade 
one Californian for Tokyo.  In the end, an isolated Japan will opt for a robust 
military and/or nuclear weapons to deter the combined Sino-North Korean threat.   
The second option is to take a more threatening stance against 
Pyongyang, enacting sanctions and diplomatic demands or even supporting a 
U.S. led military operation.  This option is a departure from Sino-DPRK relations 
and a decision to clamp down on trade between the two.  The positive outcome 
of this action includes a closer relationship with Japan, which means Japan may 
feel less a need for nuclear weapons or offensive capabilities.  Any attempts by 
the Chinese to back firm Japanese-led resolutions or actions will bolster the 
bilateral relationship.  Unfortunately, this option creates a handful of negative 
consequences.  First, South Korea will feel betrayed by the only other country 
willing to keep the north from collapsing.  Second, the Kim regime will most likely 
collapse without full Chinese support; inciting either the implosion or the 
explosion collapse scenarios accompanied by the negative effects discussed 
above.  A great uncertainty is how Pyongyang would react to a harsh Chinese 
willingness to follow the Washington consensus or threaten North Korea 
militarily.  This could spur a “do or die” attitude in Pyongyang, releasing the 
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feared explosion scenario.106  Third, the United States may feel emboldened by 
perceived or real Chinese support and seek an even more aggressive stance 
against North Korea.  Preemptive strikes and offensive operations may seem 
feasible to avoid a violent collapse scenario and an opportunity to encapsulate 
and control the situation as quickly as possible.  Finally, harsh sanctions against 
North Korea send mixed signals to Tehran.  Iran is still a large provider of 
Chinese imported oil and Beijing has played a major role in stopping Security 
Council resolutions to protect this energy source.  A sudden reversal on North 
Korea, opting for harsh sanctions, may convince Iran that it is further isolated.  
Iran in turn could do something rash, either launch an assault or test a nuclear 
weapon, threatening Chinese and American oil interests in the region.  While 
Washington seems more apt to press China into introducing sanctions and 
constantly pushes Beijing to “act responsibly,” this option proves the most 
detrimental to Beijing. 
In the third option, China ignores international calls for intercession and 
sanctions and takes no major part in resolving the talks to avoid losing face.  Like 
the four wise monkeys that hear, speak, see and do no evil, China would 
maintain a certain aloof attitude to the crisis.  As prerequisite, Beijing would 
maintain the current Sino-North Korean ties via trade and less-than-hostile 
relations.  The constant flow of oil and food would keep North Korea afloat, 
avoiding regime collapse.  In addition, this option will help China save face.  If 
there is no effort, there is no failure.  “The specter of a possible public diplomacy 
failure and the prospect of subsequent international humiliation are real fears for 
Beijing.”107  Unfortunately, this scenario also has negative effects.  First, China’s 
refusal to enter into multi-lateral discussions with other regional players would 
hurt China with respect to other regional matters.  Beijing’s refusal to intervene in 
the North Korea crisis could leave other Chinese partners (e.g., Sudan, Iran and 
Venezuela) feeling stranded against the Washington consensus.  If those 
                                            
106 Krawitz 2003, 3. 
107 Krawitz 2003, 4. 
 40
countries cannot count on China, they may contradict past bilateral agreements 
with Beijing.  Another negative consequence is that Japan and the United States 
may increase efforts against North Korea, which could strain Sino-U.S. and Sino-
Japanese relations.  More pressure or aggressive action against North Korea 
with a disengaged China may increase the possibility of North Korean collapse 
under security pressures, incite the explosion collapse scenario, and draw China 
into a much-discouraged regional war.   
The final option pits Beijing as an interested member of the regional 
community that takes limited opportunities to develop the situation to a healthy 
conclusion that suits its economic, security and diplomatic goals.  For Beijing, the 
nuclear crisis presents an opportunity to adopt what Andrew Scobell calls a “wait 
and see” stance on the issue.108  Consequences of this option are mostly 
positive because China can adopt middle of the road criteria for almost every 
issue.  For example, by adopting limited sanctions against luxury goods, Beijing 
can claim a hard-line stance that follows the international community’s lead, but 
can also keep Pyongyang afloat by continuing fuel and food shipments without 
abatement – thereby keeping North Korea from collapse.  As one senior Chinese 
leader said, “We can either send food to North Korea or they will send refugees 
to us – either way, we feed them.  It is more convenient to feed them in North 
Korea than in China.”109   
Second, China can make damning statements of admonition towards 
Pyongyang without agreeing to military action and reminding the world that North 
Korea is still China’s only defensive treaty partner.  This keeps the Kim regime 
from feeling isolated and keeps the United States from adopting an offensive 
minded platform.  Beijing has also stated it would not support North Korea 
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militarily if Kim Jong-il launched an offensive.  This is a very clear statement to 
North Korea that unilateral action would remain unilateral.        
Third, China can help the region “slow boil” into accepting a nuclear North 
Korea.110  In this case, the North Korean nuclear crisis occurred over an almost 
17-year period from 1989, when it first shut down the reactor to extract 
plutonium, to 2006, when it first tested a nuclear device.  The issue has been 
ongoing for such an extended period that each step in the process seems only 
slightly worse than the one before – incrementally increasing the temperature of 
the water.  The missile tests in July 2006, for example, performed just such a 
task.  As Bruce Klingner points out, “Kim Jong-Il assessed that a missile test 
would be less inflammatory than a nuclear test and, therefore, less likely to 
generate a strong allied response.”111  With the “heated” international community 
over the missile test, raising the temperature with a nuclear test was not as 
extreme as it could have been even a year earlier.  China can help the 
international community accept the situation by slowing North Korea’s nuclear 
aspirations long enough to avoid “flash boiling” the region.  For example, if Japan 
“accepts,” even begrudgingly and non-officially, a nuclear North Korea, Tokyo will 
not acquire nuclear weapons or adopt an offensive military posture.  This will 
work only if North Korea draws out the next step in testing or fielding long enough 
to make a nuclear North Korea the norm.      
On the contrary, China could lose face if North Korea does not act 
according to Beijing’s wishes.  The recent nuclear test, which Hu Jintao 
specifically called on Kim Jong Il to refrain from conducting, is one signal that this 
option may not come to fruition.  The 2006 missile tests are another.  Also, the 
longer this crisis is prolonged the more China must invest in keeping North Korea 
from collapsing and the more diplomatic currency it must spend in keeping the 
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situation calm.  Chapter IV is dedicated to this fourth option and Beijing's efforts 
to not only placate the region and North Korea, but also use the situation to its 
full advantage. 
B. COERCIVE INFLUENCE AND THE WILL TO USE IT 
Years of “on-again, off-again” closeness between Pyongyang and Beijing 
offers interesting commentary of China’s effect on its “little brother.”  One 
argument generally follows the logic that the two no longer carry a “lips and 
teeth” relationship.  There lacks a certain “fraternal sentimentality.”112  That said, 
the most prevalent argument, while not deviating from the belief that the 
closeness is lacking a certain “spark,” points out that Beijing’s heavy support 
towards Pyongyang places China in a very advantageous position.  Victor Cha 
and David Kang explain that the sheer amount of supplies shipped across the 
Yalu River is a “testament to the capabilities Beijing can bring to bear on the 
North.” 113  China provides nearly all the fuel oil, estimated at 90 percent, and the 
largest single percentage of food support to Pyongyang, approximately one-third 
of North Korea’s food imports.  Samuel Kim points out, “Although the exact 
amount and terms of China’s aid to North Korea remain unclear, it is generally 
estimated at one-quarter to one-third of China’s overall foreign aid.”114    
Beijing is also a large trading partner with North Korea.  Sino-DPRK trade 
has doubled since the beginning of the second nuclear crisis, jumping from 738 
million in 2002 to 1.6 billion in 2005, making Chinese trade 40 percent of North 
Korea’s total foreign trade.115  This relationship seems to have grown naturally 
rather than as a Chinese design.  As one author argued, “Intensifying economic 
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sanctions may push North Korea further into the Chinese economic embrace and 
may increase Pyongyang’s political dependence on Beijing’s will and 
benevolence.”116  This increased economic, aid-induced, and dependent 
relationship drives China’s lone capability to wield influence over the crisis.     
Evidence of past actions illustrates China’s coercive influence over North 
Korea for its own gains.  As discussed earlier, in  2003, Beijing shut off oil supply 
citing mechanical issues.  While there are those that believe the mechanical 
excuse, it did precede North Korean concessions in the Six Party Talks.117  In 
late 2005, the Bank of China, the second largest state owned financial institution, 
froze North Korean accounts to “combat Pyongyang’s counterfeiting and money 
laundering activities.”118  Whether this was designed to place stress on 
Pyongyang is unclear, but it does highlight China’s willingness to exact “narrowly 
tailored, non-publicized punitive action” against its neighbor.119  Immediately after 
the October nuclear test, Beijing “delayed” the shipments of oil and “insisted that 
Kim receive Hu’s personal representative, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan.”120  
Immediately afterward, Pyongyang announced no further nuclear tests.  One 
report showed that China will withhold aid supplies on occasion as punishment 
for unreturned rolling stock.121  When the situation permits, Beijing is capable of 
placing necessary stress and pressure on Pyongyang.   Right now, North Korea’s  
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isolation (to a point) is in China’s diplomatic interest.122  The less Pyongyang can 
do on its own, the more influence China has over its future.  But how can China 
do this to its little brother? 
The Sino-DPRK relationship suffered early and often throughout the 
decades.  If the relationship is characterized by Chinese support in the Korean 
War and immediately afterward, one can argue it was never that strong.  For 
example, the Chinese name for the Korean Conflict from 1950 to 1952 is, “Resist 
America and Aid Korea,” (kangmei yuanchao), which shows that the main effort 
was not solely a support of the DPRK or expanding the communist ideology.  
Instead, it shows that limiting America’s northern march and helping the DPRK 
defend against America were the primary factors to achieve what Beijing wanted 
– a physical barrier.  In the early 1950’s, Kim Il-Sung purged the pro-China 
faction in North Korea under the watchful eye of the Soviet Union despite the 
severe human toll China absorbed in the Korean War. 123  In 1974, Mao Zedong 
argued against the Kim succession to Kim Jong Il citing it was against good 
practice.124 Then, Kim Il-Sung was openly critical of Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  As Andrew Scobell puts it, the 
relationship went from “comrades-in-arms to allies at arms length.” 125  More 
importantly, as China continued economic improvement, the impoverished 
neighbor became an embarrassing reality of what used to be and what could 
have been.     
Popular opinion inside China of North Korean actions continues to slide.  
State-run CCTV allowed “heavy coverage of international condemnation of North 
Korea” and “little effort was made to explain the DPRK’s position.”126  In addition, 
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many Chinese view the North Koreans as “ingrates,” citing specifically a lack of 
references in the Panmunjom war museum to China’s immense role in the 
Korean War.127  A Chinese public opinion poll taken in February 2006,found 
North Korea as the second most hated country, behind Japan, and only 12 
percent of the respondents believed Beijing needed to increase bilateral relations 
with Pyongyang.128  The significance of the poll is that it occurred prior to the July 
missile launch and the October underground test.  It seems apparent there is a 
societal break between the two countries.       
There are several accounts that North Korea’s actions over the past five 
years resulted in Beijing’s loss of face.  “The [nuclear] tests made a mockery of 
…China’s policy of good neighborliness.”129  Zhu Feng, the director of the 
International Security Program at Beijing University, also notes contemptuously 
that past action “shows undeniably that Pyongyang not only lacks a basic 
appreciation of China’s painstaking efforts on its behalf, but contempt for China’s 
security interest in Northeast Asia.”130  He goes on to refer to Pyongyang’s 
actions as “No less than a slap in the China’s face.”131  The week North Korea 
chose for testing missiles in 2006 was also seen as disrespectful to Beijing.  That 
week was celebrated as the  45th anniversary of the PRC-DPRK Friendship 
Treaty.132  That week, Hu Jintao made an unusual public warning to Pyongyang 
against the launch, but his efforts were ignored – another loss of face.133  The 
test also occurred on the heels of a historic Abe Shinzo visit to Beijing and just 
prior to the arrival of President Roh.134  Furthermore, Hu Jintao, as well as his 
predecessors, made several overt calls for Pyongyang’s adoption of Chinese-
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style economic opening which the Kim regime ignored.  In 1999, for example, 
Chairman Jiang Zemin “suggested conducting economic reform so as to promote 
economic growth,” but Kim Young Nam responded, “national defense took 
number one priority.”135  There are also reports that officials and scholars urged 
North Korean counterparts’ cooperation with “Chinese leaders’ expectations.”136  
When little brother doesn’t listen, big brother is disgraced.  As Eric Teo Cheow 
aptly states, “one could indeed get badly scorched by tugging too hard at the 
dragon’s tail.”137  North Korea may have stepped over its bounds and lost its only 
potential true friend.   
The widening chasm of Sino-DPRK relations, whether taken as public 
opinion, a historical argument, or a matter of face demonstrates why the Chinese 
may have a “clear conscience” and an “open road” to use North Korea and the 
crisis to its full advantage.  “For China, relations with the United States and 
Europe are a much higher priority than those with North Korea.”138 However, 
China is clearly unwilling to expend its influence at Washington’s requests and 
demands.  On its own volitions, it sees great opportunities to impact its 
diplomatic, military and economic goals by using its coercive influence over the 
crumbling neighbor.   
C.  CONCLUSION 
Washington may wish for Chinese action in solving the crisis but Beijing’s 
options may not follow the same logic.  This chapter showed the four most 
prevalent policy options for Beijing in dealing with the North Korean crisis.  
Reviving the “lips and teeth” relationship bodes ill for the blossoming Sino-ROK 
                                            
135 Zhang Xizhen and Eugene Brown, “Policies Toward North Korea: A Time For New 
Thinking,” Journal of Contemporary China 9, no. 25 (November 2000): 542. 
136 Liu Ming, “China’s Role on the Korean Peninsula:  Its Characteristics and Development,” 
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies 11 (2001): 109.   
137 Cheow 2006, 50. 
138 “China: The Shifting Strategy On Korea,” Stratfor.com (April 23, 2007), 
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=287646, (accessed April 2007). 
 47
and Sino-Japanese relationships as well as the continuing friendship with the 
United States.  Dropping all support for North Korea as well as ignoring the issue 
are steps backwards in developing leadership roles and maintaining peace in the 
region.  The final option available, using the situation to advantageous ends, 
provides for regional peace and negates the concerns outlined in the second 
chapter.  This option requires influence over Pyongyang and this chapter showed 
that not only does Beijing enjoy coercive influence over the DPRK, but it is also 
willing to exert that influence for its own interests.  The Sino-DPRK relationship 
lacks the warmth it once had and now China’s hold on Pyongyang is really a food 
and fuel leash rather than a firm handshake between friends.  Beijing holds 
coercive influence over Pyongyang, a willingness to exert influence, and its best 
option in dealing with the crisis involves taking the lead and using the situation to 
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IV. MAKING IT WORK FOR BEIJING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A disruptive, stable, but non-violent, North Korea benefits Beijing.  The 
previous chapters argued that existing international conditions and Beijing-led 
initiatives counter the perceived dangers of the North Korean crisis to Beijing’s 
security.  As well, Beijing’s policy options are limited to keeping the Kim regime 
alive, taking the lead in the crisis and using it to its full advantage.  Finally, China 
holds certain coercive influence over Pyongyang and the willingness to exert that 
influence for its own self-interests.  This chapter argues that with that foundation, 
Beijing can then take advantage of the situation.  This crisis, while not caused by 
Chinese initiatives, offers certain opportunities fulfilling some diplomatic, security 
and economic goals only so long as Beijing retains leadership in ending or 
continuing the Kim regime.   
This chapter is divided into three sections that identify the advantages to 
Beijing for continuing, supporting, or simply denying other nations the capability 
to end the crisis.  Gaining and maintaining regional leadership and hegemony is 
the first such advantage.  The crisis widens opportunities to limit Washington’s 
capabilities in the region by exposing fissures in alliances, limiting Japanese 
leadership and influence, enhancing security arrangements in the region, creates 
excuses (as if they are needed) to increase the size and modernity of the military, 
and it helps Beijing gain a foothold in determining Korean unification parameters.  
The second advantage is found in domestic economic development and primacy.  
Improving the Northeastern region, continuing cheap labor pools, maintaining 
primary economic influence in North Korea, and limiting economic competition 
with its neighbors help thrust China’s economy towards its 2020 goal and 
beyond.  The final advantage concerns Taiwan.  By maintaining a controlling 
share of North Korea’s future, China keeps the United States military in a more 
Korean focused posture versus Taiwan focused and China may someday trade 
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its hold on North Korea for concessions on the Taiwan question.  As James A. 
Baker III points out, “North Korea is a Chinese trump card – one Beijing will 
almost certainly play.”139 Beijing’s exploitation of the crisis is neither malicious 
nor immediately threatening to United States’ interests.  As presented before, an 
explosive, collapsing Korea or war on the peninsula is anathema to both 
Washington and Beijing’s interests – something the two countries share.  This 
crisis is an opportunity of advantageous scenarios and a reason to keep 
Pyongyang alive but non-violent.    
B. REGIONAL LEADERSHIP 
After a century of humiliation, China is prepared to retake its place as 
regional power.  Realizing this goal requires dismounting the current hegemon 
and creating a sphere of influence most pliable to direct Chinese influence.  
Beijing can exploit the North Korean crisis to its successful realization of several 
steps in the process.  First, Beijing is watching and then assisting with limiting 
United States hegemony in the region.  Fissures already present between 
Washington, Seoul and Tokyo are magnified through the crisis.  Second, 
isolating Japan from the region limits Tokyo’s influence, thereby increasing 
Beijing’s.  Third, controlling the crisis allows China an opportunity to enhance 
security arrangements including work with the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), maintaining a buffer state, and possibly working towards a 
regional security forum.  Fourth, the crisis presents the Peoples Liberation Army 
goals towards increasing the size and capability of the military.  The regionally 
tenuous situation is all the more reason for increased efforts.  Finally, Beijing can 
use its leadership in the crisis towards a unified Korean peninsula friendly to 
Chinese interests.  China knows that strong relations with South Korea increase 
its chances of being the third party (behind the DPRK and ROK) in the unification  
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talks, increased economic ties, and a “foot in the door” for a myriad of other 
issues.  These few lofty goals are progressed through a prolonged and relatively 
peaceful North Korean crisis.   
1. Disrupt the United States’ Alliance System and Hegemony 
Disrupting the U.S. hegemony and widening fissures in already 
established alliances limit Washington’s capability and influence in the region.  
The first point is that the United States limited itself through its hard-line foreign 
policy decisions.  Second, its ties with the region are weakening as illustrated by 
its loosening relations with Japan and flourishing anti-U.S. sentiment in South 
Korea.  Finally, China’s actions widen those fissures in the alliance and sway the 
region to its interests.    
The United States took a hard-line stance against North Korea, which 
limited its ability to affect the situation.  The nearly unilateral attack on Iraq in 
2003 placed the world on notice of Washington’s “belligerence” and possible 
impending anti-North Korean operations.  North Korea repeatedly stated that its 
stance is directly predicated on the United States’ military posture and 
threatening position but Washington did nothing to limit that fear.  Chinese Vice 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated bluntly in 2003, “America’s policy toward the 
DPRK-that is the main problem we are facing.”140  In addition, Washington’s 
insistence that sanctions will solve the problem drove North Korea deeper into 
Beijing’s embrace.141  Where the United States lacks patience in solving the 
crisis, China has displayed its willingness towards gradual responses.142  
Reliance on China and calls for Chinese action reflect the limits of Washington’s 
options.143  Washington’s actions explain why the delegates sent to the Six Party  
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Talks are “Americanists” rather than North Korean or Nuclear experts.144 With 
the United States in a predicament where it cannot affect the situation to a 
speedy end, Beijing takes a stronger lead. 
The United States’ treatment of Japan during the crisis creates fissures in 
the alliance.  Public opinion in Japan holds the political leadership to a hard-line 
stance of resolving the abduction issue prior to any reconciliation with 
Pyongyang.  To this end, Abe hoped the United States would join Tokyo in 
solving the issue and hoisted his trust in Washington’s stance in the crisis.  When 
Christopher Hill met with North Korean negotiators in Berlin, it signaled a 
complete reversal in past policies and placed Japan in the difficult position of 
being the lone belligerent.145  “Going against its own word that it would not deal 
bilaterally with the North, Washington concluded a secret pact with 
Pyongyang.”146  As Congressman Edward Royce points out, “the United States 
now risks undermining one of its most crucial relationships in return for mere 
North Korean promises on its nuclear program.”147   
Tokyo is also sensitive to changes in United States policy decisions 
regarding Japan, and China enjoys the windfall of recent issues and alliance 
fissures.  In May 2007, Victor Cha, a well respected specialist in East Asian 
affairs stepped down as National Security Council director for Japan and Korea.  
Although this made little to no news in the United States, Japan was horrified in 
learning a 29-year-old woman with approximately 6 years analytic work in the 
region was replacing Victor Cha.  A senior Foreign Ministry official in Tokyo 
remarked, “It must be a mistake.  I wonder if Japan is being downplayed,” while 
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another remarked, “They must be kidding!”148  Then in 2007, the United States 
House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning Japanese use of 
“comfort women” during its occupation activities surrounding World War II and 
demanded public official apologies.  Coming on the heels of the hotly debated 
topic in East Asia, it is a slap in the face to Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet.  
The Japanese may question whether the United States Congress openly chose 
South Korea and China over Japan.  The timing of these fissures, during 
stressful times for fearful Japanese, fits nicely for China’s use in gaining regional 
hegemony.  
For its part, China used its influence in North Korea and the crisis taking 
steps in gaining influence in Japan and exemplifying the fissures in the U.S. – 
Japan alliance.  First, China laid the groundwork for assistance in solving the 
abduction issue.  Beijing, if successful in providing information or an end to the 
stalled Japan-DPRK reconciliation, would gain a new level of support and 
coordination in Tokyo.  Prime Minister Abe understands the importance China 
plays in solving the crisis and the fissures in the U.S. – Japan alliance.  “Hoping 
to restore Japan’s strained ties with China, [Abe] made Beijing – rather than 
Washington – the destination of his first foreign visit.”149  This represents two 
major shifts: that the United States is not seen as primary to solving the region’s 
issues and that Japan sees China as more significant than South Korea or 
Russia in Northeast Asian affairs.  As Jiang Wenran points out, “It became 
necessary for Beijing’s prestige that the new Japanese prime minister’s first 
overseas trip be a symbolic one to China.”150   
The crisis also wounds an already fragile relationship between the United 
States and South Korea affording Beijing ample opportunities for increased ties 
in Seoul.  Years of confrontational actions against Pyongyang by Washington 
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disrupt South Korean efforts at unification.  Specifically, Seoul sees America’s 
“hard-line policy and confrontational approach as having hindered inter-Korean 
rapprochement and being the primary impediment to resolving the nuclear 
impasse.”151  At every turn, the United States’ foreign policy seems anathema to 
South Korea’s goals.  Even following the July 2006 missile launches, President 
Roh and his Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok more harshly criticized the 
United States reaction than the missiles themselves.152  China’s opposite 
approach, one that demands diplomacy and patience, naturally draws South 
Korea closer and widens the fissure in ROK-U.S. alliance.  Denny Roy also aptly 
points out that “it is reasonable to assume that an unstated goal of Chinese 
diplomacy is to separate South Korea from the U.S.-Japan bloc and draw Seoul 
closer to China.”153    
By keeping the crisis alive but non-violent, the United States will continue 
to be the cause or belligerent actor and Beijing can slowly draw South Korea and 
Japan closer to Beijing’s influential circle.  As one Australian observer notes, 
“With Washington preoccupied, Beijing is having a field day maximizing its 
influence.  If this continues, Beijing will come to acquire a form of veto on many 
aspects of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.”154  The 
United States is an unwitting participant in Beijing’s goal to limit American 
leadership in East Asia. 
2. Isolate Japan 
By maintaining an active crisis, China is effectively isolating Japan 
politically and limiting Tokyo’s regional leadership.  North Korea is an excellent 
central figure presenting anti-Japanese sentiment without severe retribution.  For 
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example, the China Daily reported North Korean officials thoughts on Japan, 
“Because it is no more than a state of the U.S. it is enough for Tokyo just to be 
informed of the results of the [Six Party] Talks by Washington.”  The report 
continues, “The Japanese authorities have thus clearly proved themselves that 
they are political imbeciles incapable of judging the trend of the situation and 
their deplorable position.”155  Kim Kye-gwan, the North Korean negotiator in the 
Six Party Talks, reportedly will eat a myriad of foreign dishes but refuses 
Japanese food.156  Making Japan the subject of ridicule or debate hinders 
Tokyo’s leadership efforts and although Pyongyang is not a respected source for 
judgments, it’s biting comments are the perfect tool for that effort.   
Japanese efforts towards solving the abduction issue with North Korea 
also isolate Tokyo.  A 2007 television advertisement “blitz” geared towards 
increasing popular public support states, “Japan will get back all abduction 
victims at any cost.”  Even before the ad blitz, an opinion poll posted 70.6 percent 
of the respondents thought Japan should not provide any energy aid unless there 
is progress in the abduction issue despite regional consent on solving the nuclear 
crisis.157  The International Crisis Group characterizes it as an “obsession,” 
writing, “Tokyo’s stubborn insistence has been criticized by other participants, 
suggesting it could be left with no meaningful role in the Six Party Talks.”158  As 
discussed before, the United States’ departure from fully supporting Japan’s 
position to making bilateral arrangements with Pyongyang helped isolate Tokyo 
even further.  Christopher Hill “clearly affirmed that the abduction issue was one 
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to be decided between Japan and North Korea.”159  A political cartoon posted in 
March 2007 shows a starving and desperate Prime Minister Abe on a deserted 
island waving franticly to another island where Kim Jong-Il and President Bush 
enjoy a feast together.160  Without North Korea, Beijing would rely on historic 
memory as its only real means for isolating Japan against the region.  As it is, 
Pyongyang’s reckless behavior adds a dimension to China’s efforts towards 
regional leadership.  
3. Enhance Security Arrangements 
China wants a security situation that protects its borders and protects 
against a regional conflict.  The first step requires maintaining a buffer state 
protection.  Second is the removal of alliance systems in the region followed by 
the formation of a regional security forum under Chinese leadership. 
North Korea is a physical barrier keeping the U.S. military and its allies 
from encircling China.  As discussed in Chapter II, the importance of that buffer 
zone is immeasurable to Beijing as it serves as a “geographic and psychological 
comfort to the Chinese.”161  Regime survival proves a major step in keeping that 
comfort alive.  As a result, aid and trade increased since 2002.  As one Chinese 
scholar puts it, “When China provides aid to North Korea, some would view this 
as buying security insurance at a basement bargain price.”162  He goes on to say 
the Sino-DPRK alliance is more important to China than the U.S.-Japan alliance 
because at least the DPRK provides something physical.163  With that barrier in 
place, China can work towards other security goals.   
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As discussed before, Beijing values the disruption of the alliance system.  
Beijing can effectively build a Northeast Asian regional security forum under its 
leadership and with its interests in mind.  Michael Yahuda points out “There is no 
overarching body that brings together the key actors in Northeast Asia on a 
regular basis.”164  The Six Party Talks, while currently singularly focused on 
solving the nuclear crisis serves an excellent segue for creating a new regional 
order.  The talks brought Japan, South Korea, Russia, the United States, and 
China to the same table for security discussions several times and continuing 
that trend directly supports the entire regions’ security objectives.  The steps are 
in place: a shaken alliance system, Japan’s isolated by its own hard line stance, 
South Korea “let down” by the United States, and then China “woos” Tokyo and 
Seoul into a more Beijing centric security forum. 165  Discussions for “gradually 
converting the Six Party Talks into a more coherent and enduring collective 
security structure” occur often between Chinese and American security 
experts.166  By including every major player in the region, including the United 
States, Beijing magnanimously accepts a “responsible stake holder” position and 
leadership role in continuing regional peace without excluding or dismissing the 
current leader.  
4. Increase Military Size and Modernity 
Beijing can exploit the North Korean crisis to increase the size and 
modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA).  Chapter II described 
Japanese militarization as a negative that Beijing and the international 
community can choose to dismiss.  This chapter argues that Beijing opts to use it 
as a pretext for military build-ups and spending.  Historic memory fears that a 
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militant Japan will attempt what it did from 1894 to 1945.  While Japan may focus 
its own modernizations on North Korean threats and Chinese modernizations, 
China can cite every Japanese offensive capability as a true threat.  “Changes in  
China’s security environment would provide a basis for the Chinese military to 
demand a bigger budget and scale up military forces.”167  Another Chinese 
scholar, Zhang Liangui, notes:  
Japan has sharply increased its military spending, set up the 
missile defense system in  cooperation with the United States, 
launched several reconnaissance satellites,  expanded the 
maritime combat force, drawn up a strategy for a preemptive strike 
and strengthened the Japanese-American alliance, thereby 
accomplishing a long held  wish.168 
Zhang’s thoughts are mirrored in several Chinese writings.  One author 
referred to Japan’s “strategic movements” as “latent risk of military clashes 
between China and Japan,” adding that Japan fabricated the China threat to hide 
its intention of becoming a political and military power.”169   
The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), designed to thwart North Korean 
missile attacks on Japan, is a standard-bearer for those wishing to build the PLA.  
Beijing accentuates fears that BMD will neutralize its own nuclear deterrent force 
and may lead to Japan’s offensive stance saying, “First the shield, then the 
sword.”170  Combined U.S.-Japanese efforts at BMD in the region does not 
directly threaten China’s missile capabilities, given the sheer number of missiles 
in China versus the number of PAC-3 systems in Japan.  However, it is an 
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excellent pretext to modernize and increase the raw number of missiles in the 
region while blaming Japan for disrupting the balance.     
Japanese reconnaissance satellites are also viewed negatively.171  
Japan’s capabilities are limited as it only began its program in 2003.  The latest 
reconnaissance platform launched in September 2006 and set its orbit at about 
300 miles.172  Four months later, China destroyed one of its aging weather 
satellites at a height of 500 miles.  While this test is seen largely as a signal to 
the United States, as it most surely is, it also threatens Japanese intelligence 
collection efforts.     
5.  Korean Unification 
China supports a unified Korean peninsula only so long as it has a voice in 
its inception.  Beijing may recognize some current unification concerns: that 
Seoul’s alliance with the United States may place U.S. military units on China’s 
border; that Korean nationalism will incite severe domestic issues in China; and 
that unification might limit Beijing’s economic initiative on the peninsula in favor of 
Seoul’s economic inducements.  The economic question is explored in-depth in 
future sections.  Concern for Korean nationalism disrupting China’s domestic 
political scene is palpable.  In September 2003, a large military force was sent to 
the Jilin province to discourage North Korean refugees and rogue soldiers of the 
Korean Peoples Army.173  A Korean journalist succinctly put it, “China welcomes 
Korean nationalism pointing south, to Japan, but is concerned about its possible 
advance northward, to China.”174   
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The blossoming Sino-South Korean relationship is instrumental in 
qualifying Chinese influence on unification and curbing Korean nationalism.  
“There is no other bilateral relationship in all of Asia that has developed as 
quickly and cooperatively over the last decade as that between Beijing and 
Seoul.”175  Chinese efforts at securing ties with South Koreans covers the 
spectrum from economic and military relations to cultural exchanges for better 
mutual understanding.  A recent report shows more South Korean students study 
in China than in the United States and South Koreans make up half of the total 
registered foreign students.176  Over 10,000 South Korean companies operate in 
China, and China is the ROK's largest trading partner. 177 Reciprocally, South 
Korea is China’s third largest.  Beijing knows that leverage on the Korean 
peninsula is not found in backing the most likely economic loser (Pyongyang) but 
in enjoying stronger ties with Seoul.178  Furthermore, the Seoul-Washington 
alliance, as discussed earlier, lacks the “oomph” that Beijing now stresses.  The 
increased relationship and understanding between the two countries also limits 
the possibility of anti-Chinese nationalism in Korea.  Anti-Japanese rhetoric and 
shared historical memory also provide an excellent foundation for a pro-Chinese 
Korean peninsula.  While Beijing and Seoul benefit simultaneously from the 
increased ties, the strategic value to China’s future influence in unification talks is 
immeasurable. 
C. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL PRIMACY 
Economic development drives Chinese strategy.  Since 1978, domestic 
improvement led nearly every strategic decision.  As Zhang Yunling and Tang 
Shiping aptly put it:  
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The central objective of China’s grand strategy in the past two 
decades – strategy that may well last to 2050 – can be captured in 
just one phrase: to secure and shape a security, economic and 
political environment that is conductive to China concentrating on 
its economic, social and political development.179 
It is feasible and realistic that China exploits every situation to attain this 
goal.  Specifically, this section focuses on four major economic advantages to 
China for the life of a non-violent North Korean crisis: improve the northeastern 
region; continue leading the market in cheap labor; maintain primary economic 
influence on the northern half of the peninsula; and limit economic competitors.   
Domestic economic development fell short in the northern provinces and 
in order for China to remain competitive in the northeast, it must improve the 
entire region in general and Yanbian specifically.  The Yanbian Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture and the Tumen River area are appropriately labeled the 
“rust belt” for the poorly maintained industrial sector and rampant unemployment.  
Taking lessons from southeastern development, Beijing relies heavily on foreign 
direct investment.  Mobilizing South Korean investors, who may feel a kinship tie 
to the largely Korean diaspora in the region, introduced a vast majority of the 
funds in the form of direct investment, donations and remittances.  One report 
shows that South Korean FDI made up 74 percent of all direct investment in the 
region in 2002, provided over $10 million in donations and that Korean 
remittances valued approximately $650 million in 2003 alone (double the local 
budget).180  Japanese direct investment in the region is also high and more 
technologically advanced than that provided by South Korea.181  North Korea 
plays a key, but indirect, role in maintaining northeastern development.  North 
Korea’s collapse scenarios provide the negative snapshot of a war torn region 
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littered with refugees.  Korean unification, even if brokered and controlled 
peacefully, also negatively affects the area.  When the northern portion of the 
Korean peninsula is finally open to outside investment, Japanese, Russian, U.S., 
Chinese and especially South Korean companies will pull a majority of direct 
investment from Yanbian for projects in Korea.  The “sudden withdrawal” of funds 
from China for the “North’s reconstruction” is a realistic concern.182  The net 
result is lowered economic turnout for areas like the Tumen River project and the 
Yanbian Prefecture.  Maintaining a non-violent and non-provocative Pyongyang-
led regime equates to greater opportunities that support China’s northeast 
development.   
China’s exploding economy and receipt of FDI is directly related to its 
cheaper labor costs.  A researched and analyzed estimate in 2004 found the 
Chinese labor force averages $0.64 per hour compared to the United States’ 
$21.11 and even Mexico’s $2.48 average.183   Long Yongtu, the Vice-Minister of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation said that “China will take advantage of 
its cheap labor to attract foreign investment,” and “just as water always flows to 
the lowest point, China is bound to be the first option for foreign capital 
investment.”184  However, some companies are already turning to Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam to replace China’s cheap labor.  Wal-Mart, 
for example, boasts a line of inexpensive products produced from all over 
Southeast Asia; moving some factories out of China in favor of cheaper labor in 
newly developing states.  This competition may unsettle Chinese leaders and 
executives as unemployment is still estimated in the double digits.     
The next logical country taking jobs from China is North Korea where 
millions of workers could provide the cheapest labor in Northeast Asia.  Russia is 
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already benefiting from cheap Korean labor.  Samuel Kim exposed a “debt-swap” 
between Moscow and Pyongyang “whereby North Korea would cover 5.5 billion 
in Soviet era debt during the next 30 years by supplying workers who would toil 
unpaid in Russian labor camps across Siberia.”185  Although the Russian method 
is extreme, Beijing may see this as one early example of how Chinese workers 
missed an opportunity for employment.  This scenario runs parallel to the 
changing FDI market as foreign money and manufacturing moves to North Korea 
for cheaper labor.  Keeping the crisis active severely limits foreign use of the 
ample North Korean labor pool in favor of Chinese workers.     
Blocking foreign investment and foreign use of North Korea’s labor pool 
are primary for ensuring Chinese economic influence on the northern half of the 
peninsula.  Crisis continuation gives Chinese businesses extended timelines for 
investment projects and long-term contract negotiations.  Projects underway in 
North Korea include an expressway linking China’s Jilin Province with North 
Korea’s Rajin and Chongjin Ports, a 50-year development plan for Rajin port, and 
investment in the western line of the trans-Korean railway (the Gyeongeui 
line).186  Yi Xiaoxiong says part of the “Beijing ‘road map’” would “facilitate the 
transformation of North Korea into a large economic development zone for 
China’s economic development.”187  Certainly, recent Chinese economic gains 
“create the possibility for a potential economic colony for China in North 
Korea.”188  Crisis longevity cedes a majority of investment to Chinese businesses 
with an ulterior motive of blocking Japanese investment.  Beijing is keenly aware 
that Japan is “well positioned to establish economic and political influence in 
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Pyongyang.”189  However, the current crisis limits investment by the other major 
economic players, Japan and the United States.  
Competition with the world and regional market drives China’s economic 
development.  The continued North Korea crisis blocks certain competitive 
moves detrimental to China’s economy.  This section postulates that Beijing 
counters competition with Russian and South Korean railway production and oil 
pipeline plans by keeping the North Korean crisis active.   
Linking the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) with the Trans-Siberian Railway 
(TSR) offers faster routes for Korean goods to Europe.190  If North Korea were 
peaceful and compliant, the rail system would significantly cut shipping times and 
limit the need for sea transport, thereby lowering shipping costs.  In 2006, the 
European Union imported over 38 billion euros of merchandise from South 
Korea.191  Shortening shipping times and costs would only increase that amount 
and possibly replace some Chinese goods with South Korean made products.  
For future thoughts, a unified Korea with cheap land routes to European markets 
would affect China’s exports.  Furthermore, China only recently by-passed South 
Korean ship building in an impressive push that increased yearly production by 
48 percent.192  If Korea, Japan, and other East Asian economies took advantage 
of the TSR-TKR linkage, the Chinese ship building economy would suffer a 
tremendous hit.   
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Russian President Vladimir Putin refers to the TSR-TKR link as the “iron 
silk road”193 and envisions that it would rival China’s Pan-Asian Railway.194  
Putin hopes the transport lines will reap $4 billion in annual profit from container-
rail freight traffic alone.195  Linking the TSR with the TKR also opens a new 
market for Russia’s struggling eastern region.  However, the weak link in the rail 
line lays in North Korean unpredictability.  China already seized advantage of this 
factor and stepped up its development of the Pan-Asian Rail lines that link 
Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore with China and 
eventually the European market.196  Not only does this increase cooperation in 
the region, but also beats the competition to Europe, the Middle East and Central 
Asia.  As long as North Korea remains belligerently unresponsive to both 
Russian and South Korean attempts at improving rail line connectivity, China can 
continue competing with sea-lane shipping manufacturers and methodically 
develop its own land bridge connectivity.      
Another competitive angle surrounds Russian oil and natural gas.  Not 
only does China want to remain the primary supplier of North Korean oil 
provisions, but also wants an edge over South Korean and unified peninsular 
development.  Gazprom offered natural gas from the Sakhalin islands and East 
Siberia to the peninsula via a planned pipeline and Putin’s Far East 
Plenipotentiary Representative offered shipments of crude oil to the Sheungli 
Petrochemical plant in exchange for a large portion of the refined product.  
Pyongyang is currently not receptive to these plans for fear of developing a 
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dependent relationship for Russian oil197 – despite its dependence on China for 
the same.  In Putin’s 2000 paper on Eastern Russian development, he postulated 
that his country’s natural resources were only barely being used and that Russia 
could provide oil and natural gas to the Asia Pacific Region with steadfast 
regularity.198  Russia seems intent on including everyone in the region for its 
distribution plan.  Pipelines to China and Japan are already in negotiation199 and 
Moscow vies for connections with the Korean peninsula as well.  The 
Kovyktinskoye gas field in the Irkutsk region has an estimated capacity to supply 
Russia, China and the two Koreas for the next 30 years, “covering half of all 
energy requirements of the DPRK and the ROK at a price one-quarter lower than 
today.”200  A gas pipeline to Korea would cut the cost of energy shipments and 
increase productivity and profits for South Korean companies.  It would also 
lower China’s ability to control Pyongyang’s actions with oil – a devastating 
realization for Beijing.  Russia requires infusions of money from the region to 
complete these major projects.  The prospects that North Korea would damage 
or limit the effectiveness of oil pipelines makes it non-profitable to South Korean, 
Japanese, and even Chinese investors.201  For the time being, China can 
maintain a certain advantage and “strangle-hold” on Russian pipeline deals by 
maintaining the current North Korean regime.   
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D. THE TAIWAN ISSUE 
The issue of Taiwanese sovereignty permeates much of Beijing’s foreign 
policy.  It is not surprising then that the North Korean crisis provide leverage in 
attaining certain goals toward the island.  The complexity of the quagmire is 
beyond this thesis; however, it can be summed up as: Beijing wants full 
recognition of its rights over Taiwan and to unify the island with the mainland.  
Beyond that simplicity are security concerns for extending and defending 
sovereignty over Taiwan.  Beijing hopes to avoid a clash with the United States, 
and a dangerous North Korean crisis focuses the United States military machine 
against that single target, sparing China the threat of a strategically flexible 
opponent.  Second, North Korea is a chip that Beijing may trade for concessions 
on Taiwan.  What China may want in the future in exchange for North Korea is 
yet unknown. 
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act placed the United States squarely 
between Beijing and Taipei.  Since then, the situation heated several times, 
including the 1995-96 strait crisis and President George W. Bush’s overt Taiwan 
defense declaration.  Making matters more tenuous, Washington recently 
declared it would stage military forces from Korea in a more strategically flexible 
posture, deployable where and when needed throughout the region.202  China 
hopes to avoid open conflict with the Washington, but U.S. forces prepared to 
deploy anywhere can disrupt Chinese maneuvers against Taiwan.   
Keeping the United States busy effectively steers its attention away from 
the Taiwan Strait.  The unstable and unpredictable Kim regime “ties down 
thousands of military forces who might otherwise be assigned to Taiwan.”203  
Shen Dingli, a strategist at Fudan University in Shanghai, aptly refers to North 
Korea as a guard post that works “to contain the freedom of U.S. policy 
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choices,”204 and allows the PLA’s unhindered build-up directly opposite 
Taiwan.205  China’s goal in using North Korea for this matter is also evidenced by 
Beijing’s drop in anti-U.S. military rhetoric regarding the peninsula.  As long as 
the United States stays peacefully in Korea, focused northward, China can enjoy 
limited freedom of maneuver towards the Taiwan question.   
Preserving the peace is one step, but China is also willing to trade North 
Korea for an end to the Taiwan strait standoff.  Reportedly, in 2003 Hu Jintao 
offered a quid pro quo of, “Taiwan in return for North Korea” and repeated the 
offer to Vice President Cheney in 2004.206  It is even argued that China 
slackened its pressure on North Korea as a “gesture to show its discontent” with 
Washington’s arms sales to Taipei.207  Beijing will seek concessions on the 
Taiwan question and North Korea provides an excellent trade for an American 
administration desperate for success and closure.   
E. CONCLUSION 
China maintains coercive control over North Korea and holds an 
exploitative position over Pyongyang.  Maintaining that primacy in crisis 
negotiation affords China opportunities at gaining and maintaining regional 
leadership and hegemony, domestic economic development, and proves useful 
in the Taiwan Straits.  By watching and supporting the disruption of Washington’s 
alliances and regional hegemony, and isolating Japan from taking leadership 
roles, China can improve its security through a regional security forum that caters 
to its interests.  The North Korean crisis offers opportunities increasing the size 
and modernity of the PLA, maintains a buffer state protection, and helps China 
gain influence in future Korean unification negotiations.  Economically, Beijing 
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can use the crisis to maintain FDI in Northeast China, continue cheap labor 
trends, retain primary influence in North Korean economic decisions, and limit 
competition brought on by the TSR-TKR connection and Russian oil pipelines.  
Finally, maintaining coercive control over North Korea means China can keep the 
United States singularly focused on defending Seoul rather than strategically 
flexible towards Taiwan, and Beijing can readily trade Pyongyang for 
concessions over Taipei.  The many advantages to the North Korean crisis fall 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Whether China is the mighty dragon rising to fight or the panda joining the 
international community, the North Korean crisis is most decidedly advantageous 
to Beijing.  Chinese initiatives and current international conditions combine, 
affording Chinese leaders an unprecedented opportunity to exploit the situation 
for Beijing’s interests.   
Present literature identifies four significant dangers for Beijing involved in 
the North Korean crisis: that Japan will acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent, 
triggering a Northeast Asia proliferation chain; that Japan, short of adopting 
nuclear weapons, will militarize the state and threaten regional stability; that the 
DPRK will collapse in either an explosion model or implosion model; and that the 
United States may adopt a preemptive strike option similar to its actions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  Evidence of international conditions and Chinese initiatives 
limit the impact of each danger allowing Beijing a greater freedom for action.   
The most prevalent policy options presented in Chapter III help explain 
why Beijing chooses to take a lead in the crisis and use it to its own advantages.  
When the road is clear of obstacles, the last remaining discussion is whether 
China has the will and capacity to influence North Korea.  While arguments go  in 
both directions, evidence asserts that Beijing enjoys coercive influence that 
directly effects Pyongyang’s actions.  Moreover, the limited relationship, what 
used to be a “lips and teeth” arrangement, is more like a humiliating family 
experience.  North Korea is often the cause for loss of face for Beijing and the 
Chinese feel North Koreans are ingrates.  Little brother often makes big brother 
look bad.  The “intergroup attribution bias,” where people favor the “in-group” 
versus the “out-group,” that previously described the Beijing-Pyongyang 
relationship, eroded over time and is now only a memory.208  China’s obligated 
                                            
208 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 100. 
 72
work with North Korea exists in spirit but there is no warmth.  Instead, China 
provides enough food and oil for the survival of the Kim regime, “mostly as a 
mechanism to monitor its neighbor,”209 and exploits its little brother’s crisis to 
certain advantages.  Through a continuation of the crisis and by maintaining 
primary influence on crisis control, Beijing can attain and maintain regional 
leadership, continue unprecedented economic development, and receive certain 
concessions on the Taiwan issue.   
Gaining regional leadership and hegemony requires five significant 
developments for which the North Korean crisis inadvertently produces.  For 
Beijing to truly lead the region, it must gain positions of influence greater than the 
United States and Japan.  Therefore, the first step requires disrupting the United 
States alliance system and hegemony in the region, and second, isolating Japan 
politically and limiting Tokyo’s leadership opportunities.  When the alliance 
system and the other two regional leaders are marginalized, China can work its 
third goal, enhancing security arrangements that answer to Beijing’s interests.  
This includes maintaining a physical buffer zone between the U.S. military and 
Chinese forces as well as turning the Beijing-led Six Party Talks into a regional 
security forum.  Fourth, the crisis opens opportunities for improving the size and 
modernity of the military.  Whether as an excuse to defend against Washington, 
or against Tokyo’s aggressive response to the DPRK, the PLA has warrant for 
greater improvement.  The fifth development in this crisis is that Beijing can gain 
an increased hand in deciding the future of a unified Korean peninsula.  “With 
more power, wealth, prestige, and influence than ever before, China has 
gradually become an indispensable regional presence … where the Korean 
question is concerned.”210     
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A non-violent but continuing crisis creates situations for continued 
economic development in four areas.  First, China and its investors (e.g., Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan) can expend more capital in the Northeastern Chinese 
provinces instead of investing in a newly open and peaceful North Korea.  
Second, it allows China to continue providing the cheapest labor in Northeast 
Asia.  If North Korea opened itself to investment, its several million workers 
would take jobs that China so desperately desires.  Third, as long as North Korea 
remains isolated, Beijing retains economic influence in the northern portion of the 
peninsula, establishing long-term economic interests and investments prior to 
Japanese companies having the ability to do the same.  Fourth, the crisis limits 
certain economic competition surrounding oil and natural gas pipelines as well as 
over-land shipping routes.  Russia, South Korea, and Japan are unwilling to risk 
billions of dollars in a rail connection that runs through North Korea while the 
criminal Kim regime remains in place.  In the meantime, China can advance its 
own Pan-Asian railway linking Europe to Southeast Asian and Chinese goods.      
Concerning the Taiwan issue, Chinese leaders see an opportunity in the 
North Korean crisis.  First, the Americans’ focus on Pyongyang’s destabilizing 
and dangerous actions keeps military forces on the Korean peninsula rather than 
in the Taiwan Strait.  Second, by maintaining coercive influence over Pyongyang, 
Beijing can trade the Kim regime for concessions on Taiwan.  In effect, Taiwan is 
greatly more important to Chinese sovereignty and legitimacy than North Korea.   
China has the time and momentum for leading and continuing the 
situation.  North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons took over 16 years 
and so many resources that Pyongyang is not likely to relinquish them in the near 
term.211    Beijing  is  following  Deng Xiaoping’s advice to bide  one’s  time  while  
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building up capability and balancing Washington’s “power and influence in non-
confrontational ways, implemented so subtly so as to not to draw attention of or 
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